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In 2015 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa launched the Tripartite Free Trade 
Area, a continental trade agreement meant to boost intra-African trade. In addition to more extensive trade 
liberalization, these agreements are expected to significantly impact labor market dynamics and, according 
to most observers, boost employment opportunities.  Most studies to date examining labor market outcomes 
in member countries focus only on the changes in formal employment opportunities.  This is an important 
shortcoming because in many African countries, informal employment represents 50% or more of total 
employment. This thesis examines the impact of these deregulatory trade policies in two of the member 
countries, Egypt and Kenya, which have implemented several waves of trade reforms.   
The first part of the thesis offers a modified 3x3 general equilibrium model to assess the impact of 
tariff reduction on informal production and wages. The modifications are based on Razmi's (2007) export 
processing zone model, reflect key African labor market institutions, and incorporate assumptions of capital 
immobility and backward vertical linkages from Marjit (2003) and Marjit & Maiti (2005). The second part 
empirically evaluates the effect of trade reforms on informal employment, real wages, and formal-informal 
wage differentials, using data from labor force surveys provided by the Kenyan National Bureau of 
Statistics and Egypt’s Economic Research Forum, and tariff data from the World Trade Organization.  I 
use a two-step econometrics model developed by Goldberg & Pavnick (2003).  The first step employs a 
probit model to capture the variation in informal employment explained by industry-affiliation and produces 
normalized industry informality differentials using the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step 
restricted least-squares procedure. The second step employs WLS to regress the industry informality 
differentials against a set of industry-related trade variables. To evaluate the effect on wages, the two-step 
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Over the past 40 years, global trade has increased significantly.  Many efforts have been undertaken 
to expand trade opportunities and move towards more open trade.  This trend is exemplified through the 
creation of major trade agreements such as NAFTA, the expansion of the EU, and the rise of China as a 
trade powerhouse. While it may hold a less significant portion of world trade, the African continent is no 
exception to this process.  After an immediate post-colonial period of import substitution and protectionist 
regimes, most African countries have moved to liberalize their trade and open up their economies by means 
of tariff reduction, elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and entry into multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements. Individual countries in different parts of the continent have formed regional economic 
communities (RECs), such as the Economic Organization of West African States or the East African 
Community, and more recently the African Union has created the African Continental Free Trade Area, set 
to be the world’s largest free trade area.1  To date, several countries have signed the agreement and many 
have ratified it in the hopes of reaping economic benefits.  In short, African governments have moved to 
open their economies across the continent, and at the same time, dismantled protectionist measures and 
negotiated several trade agreements with the rest of the world.2 
Traditional trade theory suggests that trade liberalization can facilitate economic growth. African 
countries are currently amongst the fastest growing economies in the world. Cities have experienced rapid 
urbanization, creating new infrastructures to support both domestic and international trade, and numerous 
studies have praised the economic benefits that these processes will reap for African economies. Trade 
agreements are predicted to increase intra-African trade significantly and create new trade routes and 
patterns of trade with the rest of the world, resulting in an overall increase in African exports and an 
expected gain in welfare.  
 
1 Another example is that of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), launched 
on 7 June 2009 by Heads of State and Government of the COMESA Authority at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe.  
However, the relevant process has been postponed several times, and is still ongoing.  Accordingly, COMESA is not 
yet a Customs Union and should be considered a free trade area. 
2 The pace of this process has been widely debated in the past (the main point of conflict in the early years 




These studies, however, have a major shortcoming: by focusing on the formal sectors of the 
economy, they side-step the importance of informality within the African economic context and thus the 
outcomes from trade liberalization for the informal economy, This is a vital problem since in most African 
countries, on average, more than 50% of all employment is informal.  Moreover, the possibility of greater 
trade openness may exacerbate the already-existing significant problems of inequality on the continent. Not 
only is there a clear link between working in the informal economy and being poor, but also women tend 
to represent the majority of informal workers.  If liberalization leads to growth in informal employment, it 
may compound the existing gender-based income gaps and intensify the relative wage gap between the two 
sectors (Carr & Chen, 2001). 
The question is whether we would expect trade liberalization and the growth of informal 
employment to go hand in hand.  One the one hand, economic theory suggests that significant economic 
growth will boost the formalization of the informal sector thanks to greater incentives to becoming formal. 
Yet, the empirical evidence suggests a growing African informal sector over the past 30 years. Indeed, 
recent literature exploring the link between trade and informality from the experience of Latin American 
and Asian countries does not reach a singular conclusion: some studies find a positive relationship between 
increased trade liberalization and the size of the informal sector (and the relative wage earned by informal 
workers), while other studies find the opposite relationship.  Moreover, there are very few empirical studies 
that have explored this question for African countries. This thesis attempts to solve these issues by (i) 
providing a theoretical approach to exploring the impact of trade liberalization via tariff reduction on 
production and wages in the informal market, and (ii) empirically testing the relationship between tariff 
reduction and informal employment and the formal-informal wage differential for the case of Kenya and 
Egypt.  
Kenya and Egypt are chosen for several reasons.  They have implemented trade liberalization 
policies over the last several decades, and are among the top exporters of goods and services on the African 
continent.  Moreover, Kenya holds a strategic position as the largest economy in the East African 




GDP in the Arab world and possesses a considerably more diversified economy than other countries in the 
region that rely so heavily on oil (Mold and Mveyange, 2020).  Understanding the link between informality 
and trade in these two countries can uncover the challenges that many other countries in northern, eastern 
and southern Africa may face. Their experience may point to obstacles to further trade liberalization and to 
the need to combine trade reforms with other economic and fiscal reforms to achieve more equitable growth 
(Bautista et al., 2002). 
Exploring the impact on informality is important in the African context as the continent continues 
to further liberalize its trade and seek deeper regional integration. Ignoring the massive African informal 
sector can exacerbate already existing and substantial problems of inequity on the continent. As mentioned 
by Carr and Chen (2001), “there is a link between working in the informal economy and being poor.” This 
is compounded by gender-based income gaps and intensified by formal-informal wage gaps (Carr & Chen, 
2001). As revealed later in the literature review section of the thesis, African governments may consider 
combining trade liberalization with other economic and fiscal reforms to achieve goals of growth and 
equity.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents a literature review of how trade liberalization 
has materialized and impacted the African continent, with a specific emphasis on Egypt and Kenya. It also 
provides how the definition of informality has changed over time and what perspectives or views on 
informality we take up in the thesis.  It finishes up with a review of past theoretical and empirical studies 
that have explored the link between informal employment and trade liberalization. Chapter III offers the 
theoretical framework for our study.  Chapter IV presents our empirical analysis.  It includes the descriptive 
statistics of the datasets we use, a preliminary analysis, and the main econometric model, followed by an 
extension model. Chapter V provides an overview and discussion of our main findings, and offers some 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the evolution 
of international trade policy on the African continent with a focus on the post-colonial period, roughly the 
1960s onwards. The second section provides historical and methodological perspectives on how 
informality, specifically informal employment, may be defined, as well as our own definition of informality 
for the purpose of this thesis. The third section outlines the different theoretical and empirical approaches 
to the question of informality and trade liberalization. 
A. The African Continent 
In the post-colonial period the policy adopted by many of the newly independent African countries 
in engaging with the world economy changed over time.  In the initial phase, many African countries 
adopted more inward-looking policies vis-à-vis the rest of the world, in order to strengthen their own 
domestic industries, while at the same time pushing for stronger regional integration on the continent.  In 
recent decades due in part to domestic reform efforts and in part to external factors, many African countries 
have adopted a more outward-looking stance and moved to liberalize their trade both on the continent and 
with the rest of the world. It is the effects of this liberalization that is at the heart of my thesis. 
1. Background on Trade Openness on the African Continent 
Early in the post-colonial period, frustration with the dominance of the ex-colonial powers fueled 
the rise of the Pan-Africanist vision for a United States of Africa.  The vision included an economically-
integrated and unified continent against the socio-cultural, geographical and economic division that had 
been imposed on Africa.  With this vision specifically in mind, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
was established in 1963, and while the achievements of the OAU body are now widely disputed, it marked 
the start of the continent’s journey toward political and economic cooperation.  
Just 10 years afterwards, 15 West-African countries formed the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. The latter treaty, subsequently adopted 




promotion of African economic integration. Considered the building blocks of the African Union,3 there 
are eight major regional economic communities (RECs), each formed under their respective regional 
treaties.  As of 2021, they are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).  
In 1991 the Abuja Treaty established a six-stage process to create a continent-wide economic, 
monetary, and currency union –known as the African Economic Community—by 2028 by gradually 
merging the different RECs. While progress toward this final goal has been rather slow, as of today, there 
is no African country that is not a member of at least one REC.  Some in several overlapping RECs. 
Additionally, West African states have established a currency monetary union, and the 21 member countries 
of COMESA currently form a Free Trade Area. In 2008, the member states of the latter agreed to form the 
African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) to extend the agreement to EAC and SADC members, spawning the 
continent from South Africa to Egypt.  Finally, an agreement that was signed in Rwanda in 2018 established 
the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which started trading in January 2021.  While many 
African states have yet to ratify the agreement, 30 members have done so.  
In terms of liberalization of trade with the rest of the world, most African countries in the early 
decades of the post-colonial period sought to maintain a sense of economic and political independence from 
their former colonial regimes. This translated into most governments implementing inward-facing and 
import-substitution trade policies aimed at fostering the growth of domestic infant industries.  These policy 
regimes included implicit and explicit high import-tariff structures, quotas, licensing requirements, and 
tight foreign exchange controls on imports and, sometimes, exports as well.  The IMF, along with several 
 




scholars, have argued that the desire to protect local manufacturing industries, the need to raise government 
revenues, and chronic balance-of-payment problems mainly motivated these policies. 
In later decades, beginning in the late 1980s, many African countries initiated a period of 
liberalization.  Faced with declining economies, political instability, and various pressures from external 
entities to liberalize, these countries carried out various measures to increase trade openness through the 
late 1990s.4  This was followed by additional liberalization policies in the late 90’s.  
By 1999, 37 sub-Saharan countries had participated in Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
sponsored by the IMF and World Bank.  The IMF provided loans, while the World Bank assisted African 
countries in the execution of key goals of trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.  While these 
liberalization efforts resulted in overall lower protection rates and import tariffs and a relatively rapid shift 
towards outward-oriented trade policies in some of the countries, such as Uganda and Senegal, in other 
countries trade policy remained dominantly geared towards import-substitution until later in the 2000s 
(Bouët and Odjo, 2020).  From this period up to today, African trade policy varies significantly from country 
to country.  Nigeria, for example, has advanced regional integration while still maintaining a policy of 
import-substitution in relation to the rest of the world.  Other countries have continued to carry out outward-
looking policies, participating in regional value chains (RVSs) and promoting exports. 
Overall, the movement towards greater free trade on the African continent can be seen as a building 
block (rather than a “stumbling block”) to greater trade openness.  The two have, in general, worked hand-
in-hand.  The efforts to expand free trade regionally has blended into openness across the continent, with 
little evidence of trade diversion, or substitution, towards regional partners at the expense of the rest of the 
world. Although studies have differed in their specific findings, they suggest, especially for countries such 
as Kenya and Egypt, that the net effect of the movement towards greater openness is net trade creation with 
 
4 In some cases, booming economies, such as Nigeria, which benefited from rising oil exports, liberalized 
trade earlier.  Nigeria liberalized trade 1970-1976, and Kenya, which experienced a commodity boom, liberalized 




its accompanying welfare gains (Musila (2005), Ngepath and Udeagha (2018), and Pasara and Dunga 
(2020)). 
2. Kenya’s Changing Trade Policy 
Over the last 40 years, Kenya has undergone four “waves” of trade policy reforms.  Like many 
African countries, upon gaining independence, Kenya initially implemented a highly protectionist regime, 
focusing on developing infant industries in accordance with Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965. During the 
early post-colonial period, tariff policy was structured to be an effective instrument of protection to push 
import-substitution. Imported final goods such as textiles and luxury goods were charged very high tariffs 
in relation to imported capital and intermediate goods, such as building materials. For a limited period, the 
Kenyan government also turned to quantitative restrictions with the use of import licenses. Additionally, 
the government formed Foreign Exchange Allocation Committees which tended to limit scarce foreign 
exchange to those who imported certain goods that could be used in the production of exportable goods that 
would earn foreign exchange for the country. Motivated by the end of British economic occupation, the 
country followed this policy approach through to the end of the 1970s. 
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing for about a decade, Kenya shifted course.  Realizing the 
ineffectiveness of import-substitution policies and facing structural rigidities, price instability, and 
macroeconomic imbalances, the Kenyan government adopted an outward-oriented policy stance.  The 
changes that were outlined in the Fourth Development Plan (1979 -1984) and the Sessional Paper No.1 of 
1986 recommended a rationalization and reduction in tariff rates and advocated for a more liberal exchange 
rate policy and the promotion of export schemes. Known as Structural Adjustment policies (SAPs), this 
shift in policy supported the privatization of public agencies and liberalization of trade across borders 
(Gertz, 2008).  Overall, the government generated multiple initiatives: the Manufacturing under Bond 
(MUB) in 1988, Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in 1990, Value Added Tax (VAT) exemptions on 
imported inputs for exporters and on essential products such as drugs, and the creation of the Export 




encouraging the private sector to increase value added within the country and to diversify the country’s 
export base. These efforts were accompanied by an open, freely floating foreign exchange regime. 
The final wave can be seen as two distinct waves, with both continuing to push for greater trade 
openness and liberalization, and introducing new reforms with a clear export-oriented policy.  The first of 
these “waves” lasted from the early 1990s through to the early 2000s.  The goal of this period was to deepen 
trade reforms.  There were a significant reduction in tariff bands, the abolition of export duties, and 
improvement in insurance regulations.  The second wave, which started around 2008 and continues up to 
the present, is guided by the country’s Vision 2030 document (which is shared by many African countries) 
and its 2017 National Trade Policy.  Vision 2030 outlines key goals such as the promotion of decent, 
protected, and recognized informal trade and making Kenya a regional service hub.  Throughout both these 
waves, Kenya joined many regional trade agreements.5 
3. Evolution of Egypt’s Trade Policy 
Egypt’s last four decades of reforms can be separated in three different phases: (i) the first wave of 
reforms started after the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programs in the mid-1980s and lasted until 
the early 1990s; (ii) the second wave started in the early 2000s with the establishment of a new and more 
market-oriented approach to trade; and (iii) the post-2011 revolution ushered in the final stage of reforms, 
including the adoption of Egypt’s Vision 2030 in the last five years.  
Similar to Kenya and many other middle-income countries in the MENA region, Egypt had adopted 
protectionist, inward-oriented trade policies in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The government followed an import-
substitution and industrialization strategy, but eventually a combination of internal and external factors 
induced a reshaping of these policies.  In the early 1990s, Egypt implemented the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) with the support of the IMF and the World Bank. While structural 
reforms such as deregulation and privatization took longer to execute, Egypt quickly removed export 
 
5 The East African Community, of which Kenya is a member, was revived in 1999 (after being disbanded in 
1977).  EAC introduced the Common External Tariff for the East African region in 2005.  COMESA, which 
includes Kenya, was formed in 1994, and Kenya joined the Economic Partnership Agreements in 2016, COMESA-




controls and significantly reduced tariffs on capital goods and inputs. In 1998, it joined the Greater Arab 
Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and COMESA, and signed regional and bilateral free trade agreements with the 
EU, Turkey and the US.  
In 2004, the government of Egypt launched the second wave of liberalization with two objectives 
in mind:  to reduce further and rationalize the structure of tariffs, and second, to reduce the number of 
products subject to non-tariff barriers. Both the number of tariff bands and tariff lines decreased 
significantly.  This led to a notable decline in the protection afforded the manufacturing sector (Selwaness 
and Zaki 2015). Thanks to the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), customs duties on imports from 
member countries reached zero in 2005.  By 2005, Egypt’s average tariff rate was lower than that in 60 
percent of all countries and its trade liberalization efforts between 2000 and 2004 were among the strongest 
in the world (World Bank, 2005). 
In the aftermath of the 2011 Revolution, the Egyptian government readjusted its trade policy.  It 
raised import tariffs on a wide range of products, mainly non-agricultural goods electronic devices, clothing, 
shoes, and household appliances (WTO 2018).  And by 2016, suffering from a large trade deficit, Egypt 
boosted a number of tariffs, targeting goods labelled as “provocative” or “unnecessary.”  Despite this 
increase in tariff protection, in other areas Egypt continued to push for further trade liberalization especially 
on the African continent.  It played an active role in creating AfCFTA (WTO, 2018), it adopted a freely 
floating exchange rate in 2016, and over the last half decade, it based its trade policy on “Egypt Vision 
2030.”  This blueprint aims to transform the country into a leading industrial economy in the Middle East 
and North Africa region and a main export hub for medium-technology manufactured products by 2025 
(Egypt, 2015). 
4. Assessing the Impact of Trade Liberalization 
Overall, although intra-African trade has grown more rapidly in recent decades, trade with non-
African partners, and the EU in particular, remains dominant.  In part, this is due to slow or weak 
implementation of a number of the trade agreements signed by African countries.  The fastest growth in 




their trade (Economic Commission for Africa, 2010; Hartzenberg, 2011).  In general, the African trade 
liberalization process has led to a substantial reduction in tariff bands, more homogenized rates of 
protection, and a more transparent trade policy across the continent. 
In the early post-colonial period, the shift to protectionist policies and inward-oriented approaches 
to trade did not yield steady economic growth for most African countries.  At first, economies enjoyed 
strong growth thanks to high commodity prices, growing exports with major trade partners, and robust 
industrialization. However, once commodity prices dropped, due in part to lower commodity demand by 
Western countries, the terms of trade worsened for many African countries and economies suffered.  
Surplus production under import-substitution policies began to pile up. In addition, regionally integrated 
markets were not yet formed, and with often weak domestic demand, opportunities for larger integrated 
markets and economies of scale were severely limited. 
After these early policies failed to support steady, sustainable growth, most African governments 
liberalized their trade, along with introducing other reforms, in order to secure funding and support from 
the IMF and the World Bank. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were implemented from the early 
1990’s through the early 2000s.  Despite the World Bank and the IMF’s insistence on the positive effects 
of SAPs on growth and poverty reduction, their impact on the African continent remains an intensely 
controversial and contested topic (World Bank, 2000; Christiaensen et al., 2001). Several empirical studies 
have pointed to their minimal impact on economic growth in most Sub-Saharan African countries (Mosley 
et al., 1995; Easterly, 2000, and the literature cited therein; Klasen, 2003).  
The argument is that prior to SAPs, import duties were a key source of government revenue.  With 
that revenue being significantly squeezed, due to trade liberalization policies under SAPs, governments 
were unable to invest as much in key infrastructure, education, and social support schemes (Heidhues & 
Obare, 2011).  In addition, governments removed state-sponsored programs to sustain farmers. While some 
rural households, especially those with export crops, may have benefited from the SAPs, due to relative 
prices shifting in their favor, the reforms dealt a significant blow to the sector overall, which has still to 




The significant criticism of SAPs sponsored by the IMF and World Bank has pushed for alternative 
approaches to reform that have been more measured in their implementation, i.e. “adjustment with a human 
face.” Initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are 
examples.  They call for a more interventionist role for the government in promoting key sectors like 
education, health and agriculture. 
Kenya has seen increased access to foreign markets in the last 40 years, especially with respect to 
the RECs that it has joined.  In general, exports have grown, although after benefiting from high commodity 
prices in the 1970s, growth in both exports and imports was sluggish in the 1980s and early 1990s (with 
some years seeing a decline).  By the late 1990s, after more complete liberalization measures took hold and 
foreign exchange restrictions were significantly lifted, trade started to grow more rapidly.  The impact of 
import liberalization, however, has differed across sectors of the economy.  On the one hand, the once 
thriving textile industry (and by association cotton farmers) and motor vehicle industries have been hit hard 
by competition from abroad, while the horticultural and tea processing industries have recorded positive 
growth (Gertz, 2008; Njuguna, 2006).  Many studies suggest that Kenya’s overall trade liberalization 
processes have led to minimal, and even negative, job growth and have actually created more “job churning” 
or a deterioration of job quality (Gertz, 2008).  While some studies argue that informal, less secure jobs due 
to more lax labor laws have grown after liberalization, there is no clear consensus on this point (Manda, 
2002).  Examining more recent data will help to uncover the impact from liberalization on both employment 
in the informal sector and relative wage earned by informal workers. 
Similar to Kenya, Egypt’s liberalization waves have not improved the quality of jobs and may have 
reduced job stability.  The manufacturing sector, however, has enjoyed an increase in employment despite 
rising import penetration levels (Selwalness and Zaki, 2011).  An important question is whether the gains 
have been maintained since the 2011 revolution, especially as Egypt has stepped away from liberalizing its 





B. What does it mean to be an informal worker or firm? 
The debate over how to define “informality” has been ongoing for decades without reaching a 
consensus within the literature.  Traditionally, informal workers have been viewed as an isolated or 
segmented section of the labor market, with occupations such as such street traders or workers in “illegal” 
underground activities. Most authors define the informal economy in its relationship to the formal economy, 
and over the years, three main points of views have prevailed.  The first is the dualistic view, which argues 
that no direct link exists between the formal segment and the informal (or “inferior”) segment of the labor 
market. In this view, it is often assumed that only the formal economy can engage in international trade.  
The legalistic view considers government overregulation as the main cause of informality. 
Legalists argue that in some countries, operators in official, formal economic activity face high costs and 
barriers of entry in the form of excessive bureaucracy. In contrast, the informal economy has virtually no 
barriers to entry, little or no capital investment requirements, and remains unshackled by rigid labor 
regulations (Rogers, 2009-12).6 As such, self-employed7 entrepreneurs and workers operate informally to 
avoid costs associated with formal registration, such taxes and lengthy procedures to acquire property 
rights. 
The structuralist view, in contrast, perceives the sector as a residual strategy for individuals who 
cannot find work in the formal sector or who are generally excluded from it. In this case, the informal 
economy may supply cheap labor and inputs to larger formal firms.  The two sectors may thus be connected, 
and the idea of a strict duality to the labor market is abandoned. Informality is seen as a realistic response 
to harsh economic realities resulting from different internal and external macroeconomic shocks such as 
trade liberalization, rapid urbanization, or urban poverty.  
 
 
6 Rogers, Julie (2009-12). The Legalist Approach to the Informal Economy: An Affirmation of Universality. 
American University Honors Capstone http://hdl.handle.net/1961/9405  





In recent decades, many development economists have called for a reconsideration of the above 
categorizations of “informality.” Maloney (2007), for instance, questions the pertinence of these 
interpretations for Latin America. He argues that the informal sector found in developing economies should 
be considered as the unregulated, developing-country analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial small firm 
sector found in advanced countries, rather than a residual sector comprised of disadvantaged workers 
“rationed out” of good jobs. Aleman-Castilla (2006), in his analysis of Mexico, seems to agree with this 
view. He states: “One can think of the informal sector as a competitive sector with relatively free worker 
entry. Just think for example of a worker that loses his or her job and becomes a street vendor or opens an 
informal food stand in his own house.” (Aleman-Castilla 2006) Or take the case of the informal sector in 
Kenya.  It is now officially referred to as Jua Kali (Swahili for “hot sun” or “fierce sun”) to reflect its 
metamorphosis into an integral part of the country’s indigenous economy (Becker, 2004; Hope, 2001, 2012; 
Potts, 2007). 
International organizations have also attempted to provide a definition of informality that would 
allow for cross-country comparisons. In 1993, the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians 
(ICLS) adopted a definition that distinguished informal firms from formal counterparts based on a set of 
factors such as size and legal registration status. The 17th ICLS in 2003 extended this definition to informal 
employment. It classifies informal workers as employees in certain jobs regardless of whether those jobs 
are located in formal or informal enterprises. By this definition, jobs are generally classified as informal if 
they lack a core set of legal or social protections. This category includes but is not limited to own-account 
workers, producer cooperatives, unpaid family workers, and paid employees without a legal contract or 
social protections (Hussmanns 2004). 
Maloney (2007) and Aleman-Castilla (2007)’s updating of the definition of informality in 
developing economies is useful for the case study of African countries.8  First, there are clear linkages 
 
8 The term “informal sector” was first used by Keith Hart (1973) and the ILO to refer to the incidence of 
employment and income generating activities outside of formally registered enterprises in Africa. He used the 
dualistic perspective to distinguish wage workers to self-employed workers (to which the informal label was 




between the two segments of African labor markets, making the dualistic view not appropriate (Valodia & 
Devey, 2010).  Secondly, informal wage employment in many African countries exceeds the share of formal 
wage employment (Heintz and Valodia, 2008).9  This form of employment cannot be considered as residual.  
Thirdly, agricultural self-employment often accounts for the majority of informal employment, with self-
employed service providers being the second most important self-employment category in sub-Saharan 
Africa (ibid). Informal workers represent a diverse group, incorporating different types and scale of 
entrepreneurs.  As Grimm and Knorringa (2012) explain, while the current literature on informality depicts 
two main types of informal entrepreneurs,10 there exists a third category of entrepreneur, constrained 
gazelles, among Africa’s informal self-employed workers.  This final category is a blend the first two 
groups, possessing a combination of survival-oriented and growth-oriented qualities. While they have 
impressive management abilities, they operate with a low stock of capital and yet achieve high productivity 
levels and returns.  This diversity and complexity of informal employment in Africa suggests a sector that 
is open to entry and can exhibit a good degree of competition.   
For the purpose of this thesis, we build on the structuralist view of informality and consider both 
concepts of informal employment– employment in the informal sector and informal employment. We 
follow Maloney (2007) and Aleman-Castilla (2006) and classify an individual as working in the informal 
sector if they manage a firm of 9 or less employees with no social or health insurance (informal self-
employed), if they work for a firm of any size with no social or health insurance (informal salaried), and if 
they work with no substantial monetary payment (unpaid workers)11 
C. Linking Informality and Trade 
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, studies based on traditional trade theory predicted that with increased 
trade participation and the resulting economic growth, the informal economy would shrink (Hussain, 2011; 
 
9 Countries considered in Heinz and Valodia (2008) are Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Kenya, and South Africa. South 
Africa is the only exception, having more formal than informal wage workers. 
10 The first is the “lower tier” of entrepreneurs focused on survival, possessing very little capital; the second tier 
consists of entrepreneurs focused on growth and possessing a higher capital stock.  




Sinha, 2011; Heintz & Pollin, 2003). The main argument was that growth created incentives for the formal 
sector to grow.  More recent studies, however, reveal a weaker consensus on whether policies stemming 
from international trade participation would lead to a contraction of the informal sector and/or a decrease 
in the formal-informal wage gap, thereby decreasing labor market inequality. This section explores the 
more recent, theoretical and empirical studies on this question.  Most studies to date focus on Latin America 
and India.  One of the limitations is that very little attention has been given to the African continent. 
1. Theoretical Considerations 
Most theoretical models explore the impact of tariff reductions or exchange rate devaluation on the 
informal sector of the economy.  Below we review four types of models:  computable general equilibrium 
(CGE), simple general equilibrium (GE), efficiency wage, and dynamic industry models. 
a. CGE models 
Savard (2009) and Bautistia et al. (1998) investigate the income distributional effects of trade policy 
changes for the case of Benin and Zimbabwe, respectively.  However, they do not directly examine trade 
liberalization effects on the level of production or employment in the informal sector.  As Bautistia et al. 
argue, this choice of model allows for economy-wide income and equity effects of exogenous policy 
changes in contrast to other models. CGE also permits authors to put special emphasis on certain sectors 
and capitalizes on the availability of Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) constructed by African 
governments.  The limitations to SAMs is that once a sector is labeled as “informal,” it cannot be changed.  
Thus, intra-industry changes in the share of informal to formal employment cannot be explored, and the 
presence of informal workers, even at minimal levels, in all sectors of the economy is ignored. 
Bautistia et al. quantitatively examine the growth and equity effects of Zimbabwe’s 1991 and 1996 
waves of trade liberalization, deregulation, and fiscal reforms, with special attention paid to the rural-urban 
income gap.  The authors find that the reduction of import tariffs and the removal of foreign exchange 
controls increases aggregate disposable household income by 4%, but does not offset the reduction in 
government revenue by 15%. Additionally, while the gains in income mostly go toward large scale farms 




reallocation to smallholder farmers and tax hike for high-income entities, can lead to an overall disposable 
income gain for all households with the added equity effects. In his later paper, Bautista (2002) argues that 
complementary policy combinations, could have helped the country achieve the twin goals of income 
growth and greater equity. 
Savard (2009) offers two simulations of trade reforms to explore their impact on an important 
component of the informal sector, provision of trans-border trade services. In their analysis, all households 
are distinguished and separated into formal and informal types.  He conducts (a) one simulation with a 20 
per-cent decrease in import tariffs across the board, and (b) another simulation with a 10 per cent 
appreciation of the Nigerian naira in relation to Benin’s currency. The findings show that both simulations 
lead to expansion of the informal sector, stimulates informal employment and increases the income of 
informal households. The first reduces relative cost of re-exported goods going into Nigeria i.e. import-
commodities sold by the informal sector, while the second increases the relative price enjoyed by Beninese 
re-exporters, thus increasing their competitiveness.12 The reforms do affect formal firms, by reducing 
domestic production in certain industries and the price of certain goods, but only by small margins. The 
income of formal households remain relatively the same pre- and post-reforms. Wages rates in both cases 
also increases mainly due to the demand pressure from the expanding informal sector. 
b. Firm and Industry-level Models 
An alternative approach to analyzing the effects of trade policy changes is to conduct a partial 
equilibrium analysis, examining outcomes at the firm or industry level, such as Goldberg and Pavnik (2003) 
and Aleman-Castilla (2006) have done.  One of the contributions of these studies is to explore intra-industry 
substitution between informal and formal workers.  Neither study, however, reaches a clear conclusion 
about the relationship between trade liberalization and informality. 
In Goldberg and Pavcnik’s model, they assume that firms face demand uncertainty and can select 
their workers from a pool of formal and informal workers—part-time and temporary workers included.  
 





When faced with an economic crisis or downturn, firms can swiftly lay off informal workers (while keeping 
their pool of formal labor intact) in order to reduce costs. Theoretically, the authors find that the more rigid 
labor markets are, the larger the impact of trade liberalization on informal workers at representative, formal 
firms.  In contrast, Aleman-Castilla’s dynamic industry model with firm heterogeneity focuses more on the 
impact of trade reforms on industry-level wages. In this model, it is assumed that labor is the only factor of 
production, informal firms cannot engage in international trade or have access to imported intermediate 
goods while formal firms can do both.  Initially, the formal sector includes two types of firms:  those that 
engage in international trade and those that do not. With a reduction in per-unit trade costs, it becomes more 
profitable to enter the formal sector.  The model predicts that trade liberalization will force the exit of the 
least productive firms out of the formal sector and will encourage most of the remaining formal firms to 
enter international trade.  Additionally, some ‘productive-enouhg’ informal firms will find This latter group 
of firms increase their employment share.  The model predicts an ambiguous effect on the employment 
share of the informal sector.  
c. GE Models 
The last type of theoretical model we discuss is the GE model found in Marjit (2003).13  This models 
builds on the work of Carruth and Oswald (1981), Agenor and Montiel (1996), Kar and Marjit (2001), and 
Marjit and Beladi (2001).  The Marjit (2003) model attempts to theoretically trace the consequences of 
tariff reductions on wages in the informal sector under conditions of incomplete factor mobility.  It is an 
example of a “specific factors” model in international trade theory.   
Specifically, Marjit assumes capital immobility between the formal and informal sector and full 
employment of labor. The former assumption matches the reality of most African small- and medium-size 
informal enterprises as access to finance remains one of the most critical obstacles to their success.14 The 
 
13 There are other more qualitative explorations of the link between informality and trade.  However, for the purpose 
of this thesis we limit our discussion here to formal analytical models.  Some of the more qualitative works, 
however, helped to inspire the particular specification of the theoretical model employed in the thesis.   
14 World Bank. 2016. Informal Enterprises in Kenya. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. 




assumption of full employment of labor with the presence of labor market rigidities follows the model of 
dual labor markets in less developed countries used in Carruth & Oswald (1981) and Agenor & Montiel 
(1996). There is a fixed higher formal wage compared to the informal wage.  As such, workers—in 
general—would prefer employment in the formal sector, but the formal sector can only accommodate a 
certain number of workers, after which the remainder of the labor force would have to operate in the 
informal sector.  In this way, the informal sector acts as a “safety valve” to guarantee full employment of 
labor.  Lastly, the model assumes perfectly competitive output markets, which can be considered one of its 
simplifying but limiting assumptions in terms of its applicability to the African context. With these 
assumptions, Marjit finds that a contraction in the formal sector, even when it uses a produced intermediate 
from the informal segment, can easily lead to greater employment and a higher real wage for informal 
workers.  This result is strengthened when there is greater mobility of capital across sectors.  
 
Our theoretical model follows the example of Marjit (2003) not only because of the observed, more 
relevant affinity of his model to the African context, but also because the simplified derivation of the model 
and its malleability to adaptation to other modifications, which will be elaborated more fully in chapter 
three.  
2. Empirical Considerations  
 This section provides an overview of the empirical analyses that have been conducted on 
the link between informality and trade liberalization in developing countries with special focus on Latin 
America, the region which has received the most attention in this area.  Based on the studies to date, there 
is no consensus on the relationship between lowering barriers to trade and the size of the informal sector 
(and the typical wage earned) in a given economy.  Often, the findings depend on the particular context 








a. Early Work 
Similar to Bautista et al. (2002) and Savard (2007), Currie and Harrison (1997) focus on a 
somewhat different but related question about the role of trade liberalization in restructuring the economy.  
Rather than directly examining informality in the economy, they assess the impact of trade reform on 
employment in manufacturing firms in Morocco in the 1980s. Nevertheless, they offer insights into the role 
of trade protection in labor market composition in Morocco.  Specifically, the authors carry out a survey of 
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees to examine how employment changes with lower tariff 
protection.  Their results suggest that a 21-point decline in tariff protection for import-competing sectors 
such as textiles was associated with a 3.5% decline in employment.  Exporting firms saw a steeper drop by 
an additional 2 percentage points.  They also find that government-controlled firms reacted differently from 
private firms by increasing employment in response to the tariff reductions, mostly by hiring low-paid 
temporary workers. 
b. Seminal Work in the Field 
Most empirical analyses that study the direct impact of tariff reductions and other forms of trade 
liberalization are based on the industry wage premia model developed by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001) and 
later adapted in their 2003 paper.   In the latter paper, they use a two-step econometric model to explore 
how the trade liberalization process in Columbia, from 1984-88, and in Brazil, 1987-88, their large informal 
sectors, respectively.15  For both countries, tariffs had remained the main instrument of trade policy up until 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, when they joined the World Trade Organization (then named the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).  As trade liberalization efforts got underway, the proportion of the 
workforce employed in the informal sector began to grow (reaching a peak in the late 1990s). This 
coincidence in timing, according to the authors, led many to believe that opening up the economy to foreign 
competition had caused the growth of the informal sector.   The authors tested this relationship and found 
 





mixed results.  They found a positive but secondary and small relationship between tariff reductions and an 
increase in informal employment in Columbia. They, however, did not find increased probability of within-
industry level of informal employment for the case of Brazil (Goldberg and Pavnik, 2003).  
c. Building on the Goldberg and Pavcnik 
Marjit and Maiti (2005) revisit the authors’ data and analysis, and they discover two opposing 
effects on informal employment.  One the one hand, they find the same positive effect of tariff reduction 
on informal employment, but, on the other hand, they discover a simultaneous, opposing negative effect of 
interest rates on informal employment. They assert that while lower tariffs can lead to an increased level of 
informal employment, lower interest rates produce the opposite effect. They claim that the two opposing 
effects offset each other for the case Brazil, while in Columbia the interest rate drop was minimal and 
therefore the tariff effect prevailed.  In other words, they argued that other variables had to be examined at 
the same time in order to understand more fully the relationship between informality and trade 
liberalization. 
In contrast, Aleman-Castilla (2007) examine the Mexican experience with tariff reductions based 
on the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.  Similar to the case of Brazil and Columbia in 
Goldberg and Pavcnik’s study, the Mexican share of informality to total employment increased from 47% 
to 49% from 1990 to 2002 (Aleman-Castilla, 2002).  However,  
Aleman-Castilla expands on the methodology of Goldberg & Pavcnik by exploring the effect of 
tariff reduction not only on the likelihood of informal employment, but also on the general wage level and 
the formal-informal wage differential.  He finds that Mexican tariff reductions have a negative impact on 
informality levels, with a dampened effect for industries with higher levels of import penetration. He also 
concludes that the elimination of the U.S. import tariff helps in reducing the rate of informality in export-
oriented industries but widens the formal-informal wage gap in the long-run.  
Selwaness & Zaki (2013) and Ben Salem & Zaki (2019) explore a similar question for Egypt for 
the years 1998, 2006, and 2012.  Using the same data set as this thesis, they find that tariffs are positively 




wage workers and for workers in the manufacturing sector.  However, the effect of the tariff reduction on 
within-industry level of employment is small in magnitude. Therefore, the authors conclude that the results 
imply that trade liberalization leads to a decrease in the level of informal employment in Egypt. In contrast 
to Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) and Aleman-Castilla (2007), who also considered trade variables such as 
import-penetration and export-orientation and cross variable interactions, Selwaness and Zaki (2013) and 
Ben Salem and Zaki (2019) only consider tariff and lagged tariff values. 
The premise of the Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) methodology in linking informality and trade-
related variables is based on the assumption that formal-informal mobility within industries is stronger than 
mobility across industries. In other words, they show that there are more individuals who switch between 
informal and formal employment in the same industry rather than those who do so by relocating to another 
industry. 
In our empirical model, we employ the Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) approach with the Selwaness 
and Zaki (2013) and Ben Salem and Zaki (2019) modifications. We do this for two reasons.  First, Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2003) have become the main standard in the literature exploring the connections between 
informality and trade.  Second, the Selwaness, Zaki and Salem modifications are in line with the availability 
of trade data in Kenya and Egypt, and their model avoids the endogeneity problems that may be present if 
we were to include non-tariff trade variables, as Goldberg and Pavcnik do.  
Before we turn to our own empirical analysis, we construct a model, or theoretical framework, that 
tells a story about how, and through what mechanisms, trade liberalization may affect employment and 





III. THEORETICAL MODEL 
To begin our analysis on how trade liberalization can affect the level of informal employment in a 
developing economy, we formulate the mechanism through which such an effect may take place. We use a 
simple general equilibrium model similar to Marjit (2003) to illustrate this process theoretically. We 
consider the impact of a change in trade policy on not only the informal wage, but also on informal and 
formal rents and informal production. Finally, we provide a thorough derivation of the model in Appendix 
1. By use of this model, we illustrate how a decrease in the price of the protected import-competing good 
will most likely lead to an expansion of the informal sector and, in some cases, to an increase in the formal-
informal wage differential. 
A. Model Specifications  
Our model is inspired by the work of Marjit (2003) and Razmi (2007), while Holt and Littlewood 
(2014) inform our thinking about the possible linkages between formal and informal production in the 
economy. Our goal is to represent a stylized developing country that possesses many of the institutional 
features common to African economies, such as Kenya and Egypt. It consists of a three-sector small open 
economy producing two traded goods and one non-traded intermediate good.16 One of the traded goods 
represents the formal sector of the economy; the second traded good and the non-traded intermediate good 
represent the informal sector. Thus, the informal sector is composed of two subsectors one competing in 
world markets at a given price and the other whose price is set by domestic conditions. Let: 
• 𝑋 be the import-competing good produced in the formal sector with labor, earning a fixed wage 𝑊, 
formal capital, 𝐾𝐹, and a domestically-produced intermediate good, 𝑁. Firms producing 𝑋 enjoy 
tariff protection thanks to their affiliation to the formal sector. Thus, the domestic price of good 𝑋, 
𝑃𝑋, is higher than the world price. Formal capital is sector-specific and thus remains employed only 
in the production of good 𝑋. We assume that jobs in the formal sector are always preferable to those 
in the informal sector due to higher wages (i.e., a wage premium) and basic legal protections and 
provisions. We can consider 𝑊 as a negotiated unionized wage. 
 
• 𝑌 be the exportable good produced in the informal sector of the economy with labor, earning a 
market-determined competitive wage 𝑤, informal capital 𝐾𝐼, and an imported intermediate good, 
 
16 A “small” economy takes prices of traded goods as given. Its own actions (e.g., the amount it exports or imports) 




𝑀, similar to Razmi’s 2007 EPZ model.17 Thus, the model adds to Marjit’s 2003 work by 
incorporating the use of an imported intermediate good in one segment of informal production. 
This segment can be thought of as the urban informal sector ala Holt and Littlewood (2014). 
 
• 𝑁 be the intermediate good also produced in the informal sector of the economy. It is produced 
using labor (earning the competitive wage, 𝑤) and informal capital 𝐾𝐼. Thus, the informal sector 
provides an input to the formal sector, and 𝑁 represents an important linkage between the two 
sectors. Together, 𝑁 and 𝑌 form a “nugget” in the economy insofar as using the same inputs and 
facing the same input prices. 
Informal capital is only partially mobile: it can freely move between the production of 𝑁 and 𝑌, 
but it is sector-specific; it cannot move between the formal and informal sectors. Moreover, we assume 
𝑊 > 𝑤: there always exists an formal-informal wage differential. There are never enough jobs in the formal 
sector to employ all workers. When workers cannot find jobs in the formal sector, they will resort to working 
in the informal sector in order to survive. This “clears” the labor market and ensures full-employment. In 
this way, the informal sector acts as a safety valve, and we observe full-employment with a competitive 
informal wage within the framework of labor market rigidities (a persistent wage-differential and a fixed 
formal wage). Lastly, we assume perfectly competitive markets, technology that exhibits constant returns 
to scale with diminishing returns to individual factors, and full employment of resources.  
The following table provides the symbols we use to describe the full model. This widely used 
notation is based on Jones (1965; 1971).  
 Variable definitions 
𝑃𝑖 Price of good 𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝑋, 𝑌,𝑀,𝑁 
𝑎𝑗𝑖 Unit-input 𝑗 requirement for good 𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝐿, 𝐾,𝑁,𝑀  
𝑤 Informal wage 
𝑊 Formal wage 
𝑟 Return to informal capital 
𝑅 Return to formal capital 
𝐾𝑜 Stock of capital for sector 𝑜, 𝑜 = 𝐼, 𝐹 




Supply of intermediate good 𝑁 
Elasticity of substitution in the production of good 𝑖 
Ratio of factor 𝑗 used in the production of good 𝑖 
𝜃𝑗𝑖 Ratio of unit-cost for factor 𝑗 in the production of good 𝑖 
|𝜆||𝜃| Determinants of the matrices composed of 𝜆𝑗𝑖 and 𝜃𝑗𝑖 in the informal sector 
 




The competitive price conditions are given by:18 
𝑅𝑎𝐾𝑋 + 𝑊𝑎𝐿𝑋 + 𝑃𝑁𝑎𝑁𝑋 = 𝑃𝑋 (1) 
𝑟𝑎𝐾𝑌 + 𝑤𝑎𝐿𝑌 + 𝑃𝑀𝑎𝑀𝑋 = 𝑃𝑌 (2) 
𝑟𝑎𝐾𝑁 + 𝑤𝑎𝐿𝑁 = 𝑃𝑁 (3) 
Full-employment conditions require: 
𝑎𝐿𝑋𝑋 + 𝑎𝐿𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐿𝑁𝑁 = 𝐿 (4) 
𝑎𝐾𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐾𝑁𝑁 = 𝐾𝐼 (5) 
𝑎𝐾𝑋𝑋 = 𝐾𝐹 (6) 
𝑎𝑁𝑋𝑋 = 𝑁
𝑑 = 𝑁 (7) 
Due to the assumption of perfectly competitive markets and the fact that 𝑁 is a non-traded good, 
demand must equal supply of the good. Thus, we have the zero-excess demand function:  
𝐸𝐷(𝑁) = 𝑁𝑑 − 𝑁𝑆 = 0 (8) 
While there is substitution between capital and labor in the production of all three goods, the 
intermediate goods, 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀, are complements in the production of 𝑋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌 respectively, i.e. 𝑎𝑁𝑋, 𝑎𝑀𝑌 
are considered fixed. 
General Equilibrium Solution: 
With exogenous values of (𝑃𝑋, 𝑃𝑌, 𝑃𝑀 , 𝐿, 𝐾𝐼 , 𝐾𝐹) given, we determine the equilibrium values for 
(𝑅,𝑤, 𝑟, 𝑃𝑁 , 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑁) using the above equations. We have seven unknowns and seven equations, as such the 
system is solvable. We proceed in our analysis as follows: for a given (𝑃𝑁 ,𝑊), we solve for 𝑅 from (1). 
Then, we solve for 𝑋 from (6) and assuming that 𝐾𝐹 is fixed, we simultaneously solve for (𝑤, 𝑟) from (2) 
and (3). Equations (4) and (5) allow us to form an expression for 𝑌 and 𝑁. We substitute our expression for 
(𝑅,𝑤, 𝑟) in terms of the initial arbitrary 𝑃𝑁 into 𝑌 and 𝑁. The latter expression of 𝑁 gives us 𝑁
𝑆, and since 
the expression for 𝑋 allows us to form an expression for 𝑁𝑑 = 𝑎𝑁𝑋𝑋, we finally solve for 𝑃𝑁 using (8).  
 





B. Comparative Statics 
We introduce a change in trade policy to examine the effects of trade liberalization on the economy. 
Specifically, we explore the effect of a decrease in the import tariff applied to the formal good 𝑋. This leads 
to a decrease in 𝑃𝑋, which, due to protection, begins above the level of the externally given world price. 
The price of the imported intermediate good 𝑃𝑀 remains the same.  
The drop in 𝑃𝑋 will lead to a contraction in the production of 𝑋. The import-competing sector feels 
the effect of greater competition from abroad for it no longer enjoys as much (or any) protection. Some 
workers originally employed in the formal sector must exit and seek employment within the informal sector. 
Those who remain employed in the formal sector continue to earn the given wage, 𝑊, while the return to 
formal capital must decline to ensure its full employment. That is, although the level of production of 𝑋 
declines, its production technique becomes more capital-intensive as 𝑊/𝑅 increases. Lastly, since 𝑁 is an 
intermediate good in the production of 𝑋, there must also be a change in 𝑃𝑁 in response to a decrease in the 
demand for and supply of 𝑁. Whether 𝑃𝑁 increases or decreases depends on how the informal sector 
responds to the influx of labor and the changes in factor prices. 
As such, our comparative statics start with the decrease in 𝑃𝑋 denoted as ?̂?𝑋 < 0.19 As mentioned 
above, this leads to a contraction of the formal sector: ?̂? < 0. Since 𝑁 is considered a complement to the 
production of 𝑋, the demand for 𝑁 must decrease, i.e. ?̂? < 0. Now suppose this decrease in the demand for 
𝑁 leads to a reduction in its price: ?̂?𝑁 < 0. If the production of 𝑁 is more capital intensive than the 
production of 𝑌, then by the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, the informal wage rate must increase while the 
rent for informal capital decreases: ?̂? > 0, ?̂? < 0. 
While the contraction in 𝑋 reduces the demand for 𝑁, it also releases labor into the informal sector 
of the economy. As such, the share of the labor force employed in the production of 𝑋 decreases, ?̂?𝐿𝑋 < 0. 
Since we are assuming full employment of labor, it must be that |?̂?𝐿𝑋| = ?̂?𝐿𝑌 + ?̂?𝐿𝑁 > 0. Consequently, 
 




since 𝑌 is labor-intensive relative to 𝑁, the production of 𝑌 must expand at the expense of 𝑁 by the 
Rybczynski Theorem. We thus have a simultaneous decrease in the demand and supply for the domestic 
intermediate good, resulting in an ambiguous final effect on 𝑃𝑁. However, as Marjit (2003) explains, if it 
assumed that the labor force share of the formal sector is not substantial to begin with, i.e. ?̂?𝐿𝑋 ≅ 0, then 
the effect of the Rybczynski Theorem on the informal sector is minimal, and it can be concluded that the 
drop in 𝑃𝑋 leads to an increase in the wage in the informal sector at the expense of informal capital. 
Circumstances, however, become considerably less favorable for the wage in the informal sector if 
it is assumed that the production of the domestic intermediate 𝑁 is more labor-intensive than 𝑌. Let’s start 
once again from the decrease in the demand for 𝑁 leading to a reduction in its price, ?̂?𝑁 < 0. By the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem, we know that the informal wage must decline while informal capital will enjoy higher 
rents. Moreover, the release of labor from the formal sector must lead to an expansion in the production of 
𝑁 to the detriment of the production of the traded informal good 𝑌. In this way, the drop in 𝑃𝑁 from the 
decline in demand for 𝑁 is reinforced by the expansion of its supply per the Rybczynski effect. This leads 
to an unambiguous decrease in 𝑃𝑁, decline in wages in the informal sector and rise in the return to informal 
capital.  





























(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁)?̂?𝑁 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
1
|𝜆|𝜃𝐾𝑋
(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 
The main findings are presented in the following two propositions: 
Proposition 1: A lower tariff level resulting in decreased protection for the import-competing sector 




(?̂?𝐿𝑋 ≅ 0) and that the production of 𝑁 is capital intensive relative to 𝑌 (|𝜆|, |𝜃| < 0), tariff reduction can 
result in (1) a fall in the formal-informal wage differential (𝑊 − 𝑤), as wages in the informal sector 
increase, and (2) an increase in the level of informal employment in sub-sector 𝑌. 
Proposition 2: Assuming that the production of 𝑁 is labor-intensive relative to 𝑌 (|𝜆|, |𝜃| > 0), 
tariff reduction causing a decrease in the price of the formal good 𝑋 (?̂?𝑋 < 0), results in (1) an expansion 
of the formal-informal wage gap (𝑊 − 𝑤), as informal wages decline, and (2) an increase in informal 
employment in the subsector 𝑁. The wage effect is magnified further if the labor force share of the formal 
segment is substantial (?̂?𝐿𝑋 > 0).  
In both scenarios, the formal sector producing 𝑋 will contract, the return to formal capital 𝑅 (the 
rent earned by 𝐾𝐹) will unambiguously decrease, and labor will leave the formal sector in search of 
employment in the informal sector of the economy. The proof of these propositions as well as the full 
algebraic derivation of the comparative statics is provided in Appendix 1. 
C. Discussion 
In constructing this model, we are not assuming this is the only model specification that can capture 
the impact of trade liberalization in countries such as Kenya or Egypt. One of the limitations of the model 
is that it does not incorporate a formal exportable good, such as Kenya’s horticultural industry, which can 
benefit from increased access to markets20. However, the relevance of the model centers around highlighting 
the impact of trade liberalization, specifically reduced import tariffs, on an informal sector that partially 
competes with an import-competing formal sector. 
We can find specific examples of informal markets expanding in response to more open import 
markets in Kenya’s trade liberalization waves of the 1990s and early 2000s. With greater competition from 
abroad, Kenya’s thriving textile industries (a formal sector) were hit hard. While the industry accounted for 
roughly 30% of manufacturing and provided revenue for thousands of cotton farmers in the pre-
 
20 This is further proven in the preliminary analysis of within vs. between industries shift in informal employment, in the empirical analysis 




liberalization period, by 2005 approximately 80% of Kenyans were wearing some of the $23 million of 
imported second-hand clothing (Gertz, 2008; Njuguna, 2006). Additionally, as discovered by Holt and 
Littlewood (2007), in countries like Kenya formal intermediary vendors will import these goods from the 
international market and resell them to informal vendors. As in the example of the Beninese-Nigerian 
informal border trade in Savard (2009), these informal vendors would not only provide for these goods on 
the domestic informal market but also participate in Informal Cross-Border Trade (ICBT). The intuition in 
making the informal good 𝑌 an exportable good therefore comes from the incidence of large ICBT for 
Kenya (Gor, 2012; Lesser and Moisé-Leeman, 2009). 21 
We now turn to the empirical part of this thesis to empirically evaluate whether the deductions we 
find from theoretical model are borne out in the data. We start this section with an overview of the labor 
force and trade data we use.     
  
 
21 While ICBT is not as common for Egypt, we provide an explanation on how the model could be rethought to portray an alternative formal 




IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Source of data 
1. Trade 
In line with Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Aleman-Castilla (2006), and Zaki (2013, 2019), we use 
tariff data as a proxy for each country’s trade policy, i.e., tariffs are considered the main policy driver.  
Although non-tariff barriers can play an important role in trade policy on the African continent, unlike 
tariffs, they cannot be easily quantified and separated by product group and industry (Mevel & Karingi, 
2005; Mold & Mukwaya, 2015).  Thus, we follow the methodology of other studies in limiting our empirical 
analysis to tariffs.  
The tariff data are obtained from the World Trade Integrated Solutions (WITS) online software. 
WITS allows registered users to access and download merchandise trade and tariff related statistical data. 
The software extracts original data from the United Nations International Trade Statistics Database (UN 
Comtrade), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade Analysis Information System 
(UNCTAD TRAINS), and the World Trade Organization Integrated Database and Consolidated Tariff 
Schedule (WTO IDB & CTS).  
We extract Most Favored Nations Applied Duty rates mainly from two databases: WTO-IDB & 
TRAINS. 22These tariff data are divided at the International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities (ISIC) revision 3.1 at the seven-digit tariff line level. There are about 27,000 Egyptian 
tariff lines for the year 1998, 2006, 2012 and 2018, which increases further when adding one-year and two-
year lagged tariff values. While we consider 1999, 2005 and 2019 survey data for Kenya—more details 
below—2017, 2018 and 2019 tariff data separated at the ISIC level are not available. As such we proxy 
these tariff values with the 2016 tariff levels (and 2015 for lagged tariff values). There are approximately 
16,000 tariff lines for the 1999, 2005 and 2016 Kenyan datasets obtained from WITS.  
 
22 MFN tariffs are the tariff levels on imports a country tends to impose on other members of the WTO who do not 




To simplify our analysis and to match the labor force analysis, we compile and average these tariff 
lines at the 2-digit ISIC level. In order to avoid incorrectly skewing the tariff data, we also exclude the tariff 
lines for some goods who faces specific duty rates (no ad-valorem equivalents) and focus on tariff lines 
with numerical ad-valorem values. 
2. Labor Force  
We use Kenyan and Egyptian household and labor survey data.  Specifically, for Egypt we use data 
obtained from the Economic Research Forum from the 1998, 2006, 2012 and 2018 Egyptian Labor Market 
Panel Survey (ELMPS). Through the Open Access Micro Data Initiative (OAMDI), the Economic Research 
Forum (ERF) allows registered users to apply for Licensed Dataset Request Status. Upon approval, the user 
would receive access after signing to a set of confidentiality and terms of use agreement. The ERF team 
collects, harmonizes, validates and disseminates the multitudes of survey micro-data in close partnership 
with Egypt’s statistical office, the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 
The surveys we use in the thesis provide data on (i) basic demographic characteristics (ii) the 
characteristics and status of employment and data on (iii) the family enterprise (an possible informal 
business organization), and (iv) individual earnings. The 2006, 2012 and 2018 survey waves are considered 
follow-ups to the preceding year. The four together then form a periodic longitudinal survey that tracks the 
labor market and demographic characteristics of the households and individuals interviewed. However, for 
each new year of data to remain nationally representative, a “refresher” sample of households is added. 
The 1998 data were acquired from a CAPMAS 1995 master sample of 750,000 households from which 
1,500 were selected.  
Table 1 below provides a detailed breakdown of each of the four waves of surveys and its 










Number of households re-
sampled from previous wave 
Number of “refresher” 
sample of households  
1998 4,816 23,997 n/a n/a 
2006 8,349 37,140 4,816 2,500 
2012 12,060 49,186 6,752 2,000 
2018 15,746 61,231 13,793 1,953 
Table 1. ELMPS 1998, 2006, 2012 & 2018 
The data for Kenya are based on different types of household and labor force surveys conducted 
and provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). The surveys are the 1998/99 Integrated 
Labour Force Survey (ILFS), the 2005-2006 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS), and 
the 2019 Kenya Continuous Household Survey Programme (KCHSP).  
Thanks to the World Bank-funded Accelerated Data Program (ADP) in partnership with the 
DataFirst initiative of the University of Cape Town, the KNBS is able to process and provide registered 
users access to download datasets from their microdata library once a dissemination and confidentiality 
agreement is signed. Our study focuses on the components from these datasets which provide (i) basic 
demographic information (ii) individual economic activity, labor force and employment characteristics, and 
(iii) the presence of household non-farm enterprises.  
The 1998/1999 ILFS covers a total of 11,049 households, and integrates three related major 
components: labor force, informal sector and child labor modular surveys. The 2005-2006 KIHBS covers 
a total of 24,000 households and include information on health, fertility and deaths, energy use, and a 
community “justice” section. The final survey for Kenya, the 2019 KCHSP sample consists of 25,260 
households, and very much like the KIHBS, provides housing conditions and ownership, access to water, 
sanitation and source of energy utilized by households.  
It is important to note that while there exists a 2015/2016 KIHBS, the industry affiliation variable 
is unfortunately missing from the downloadable microdata and generally not available across other 




this dataset from our analysis of Kenya and only focus on the three others which contains industry affiliation 
in accordance with ISIC. 
B. Noteworthy Adjustments and Changes 
1. Industry Affiliation 
Across time, there is an inconsistency in the data in terms of how economic activity or industry 
affiliation is coded. For example, in 1998 ELMPS, ISIC rev. 2 is used to code economic activity, while the 
2012 and 2018 surveys use the most updated ISIC rev. 4 version. The same holds for the 2006 and 2019 
Kenyan datasets. In order to carry out the study, individual worker industry affiliation must be assigned and 
coded similarly across the different years. 
According to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), newer revisions 
of ISIC are necessary to reflect the current structure of the world economy and to recognize newly emerging 
industries. As such, ISIC rev 4 contains significantly more classifications than ISIC rev 2, which poses an 
issue for our empirical analysis. In order to remedy this inconsistency, we create new variables to remap all 
industry classifications from ISIC rev 2 and ISIC rev 4 to ISIC rev 3 at the 2-digit level. 23  However, due 
to the non-presence of some classifications in ISIC rev 2, some industries are combined with others to form 
a compound category. For instance, ISIC rev 3 categories, "60: Land transport; transport via pipelines," 
"61: Water transport," "62: Air transport," "63: Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies," are combined into one new “60: Transport & Storage” category. This is to account for 
the fact that ISIC rev 2 closest corresponding category “71: Transport and Storage” is too broad to be 
mapped to a single ISIC rev 3 category at the 2-digit level. 24   
 
23 Using classification beyond the 2-digit level will saturate the regression with approximately 1000 dummy 
industry variables and may result in inaccurate estimation results. Additionally, while re-categorization at a higher 
digits level may be possible, in order to map from one ISIC revision to the other, one must have unique values of the 
original ISIC code (ISIC rev 2 and rev 4) mapped to unique or non-unique values of the target ISIC. The 
correspondence tables provided by the United Nations provide unique values of ISIC 3 (our target classification), 
but not unique values of ISIC rev 2. 
24 A number by number 2-digit remapping from ISIC rev 4 and ISIC rev 2 to ISIC rev 3, and from the 




In addition to following the steps of Selwaness and Zaki (2003), Aleman-Castilla (2007) and others 
who uses the same methodology as we do, this remapping allows us to link the tariff variables with the 
results obtained from the labor force data.  Lastly, the tariff data available, separated at the original ISIC 
rev 3 level, are averaged to match the special ISIC rev 3 remapping that we use. This remap allows us to 
link the tariff variables with the results obtained from the labor force data, and relate our results across time 
with the same standard of industry classification. Lastly, the tariff data available which are separated at the 
original ISIC rev 3 level, are averaged to match the special ISIC rev 3 remapping which we use.  
2. Informal and formal employment determination 
As discussed in the literature review section, we classify informal workers using three major 
categories: informal self-employed, informal salaried, and unpaid workers. We proceed in determining the 
value for the informal classification variable with the following procedure. 
First, we check if there exists an institutional informal sector affiliation provided by the survey (this 
is the case for all Kenya datasets). The individual is automatically considered part of the informal sector if 
they are reported as an informal worker. If the previous check does not result in informal classification, 
then we determine the employment status for the individual worker. Across all surveys categories, these 
are in general: (1) waged employee, (2) self-employed/ own-account (3) unpaid workers. If they fall under 
(1) or (2), we check for the incidence of social and medical insurance. In cases where yes/ no answers are 
not available in the dataset, we check for a non-zero amount of medical and social benefits for the worker. 
We then check for firm size for the self-employed worker and the incidence of work contracts for the waged 
worker. The lack of either medical or social insurance results in classification as informal for self-employed 
workers in a firm with less than nine people. For wage employees, the lack of a contract, medical or social 
insurance will result in classification as an informal wage worker. Unpaid workers or workers who receive 
larger in-kind than monetary payments are classified as informal as well (whether they are household 
members or not). After we determine which workers are informal, we do not automatically assume that the 
rest of the labor force are formal workers. Instead, we assume that (1) government workers and (2) waged 




workers who do not fall under any category after the two classification process are left out of the analysis. 
As such, in some cases, a large number of observations are excluded but this is preferable to simply 
assuming a worker is formal if they are not informal (or otherwise). This action could also skew the data to 
hold more formal or informal employment than there actually are.  
While the data provide information on secondary jobs, as well as the wage level and industry 
attached to these jobs, we do not take into consideration these variables for two main reasons. (1) 
Reclassifying workers according to sectoral affiliation of their secondary occupation changes the share of 
informal workers very minimally. (2) Determining from which occupation to extract the final industry 
affiliation and wage value for the empirical analysis (for the empirical model extension) is complicated and 
may skew the results. We, however, note a growing trend of individuals reporting more than one income-
earning economic activity. For future research on the matter of informality, it may be of interest to consider 
a non-binary variable to take into account formally employed individuals with strong ties to the informal 
sector given that the economic activity classifications are available for all the occupations, and their 
informality—or otherwise—can be determined.  
Now that we have adequately elaborated on the sources, adjustments and changes made to the 
original datasets, we can move on to talk about the descriptive statistics for the labor force and tariff data.  
C. Descriptive Statistics 
1. Egypt: Labor Force 
Once workers in both informal and formal sectors have been identified, we examine how individual 
as well as job characteristics differ across the sectors. Table 2 provides a summary of those differences 





 1998 2006 2012 2018 
 Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Avg. Monthly Wage 
(EGP) 
 
921.6 421.9 1,282 522.2 1,488 1,028 2,423 2,003 
Being a Woman 0.280 0.144 0.294 0.227 0.299 0.136 0.283 0.392 
Age 40.42 28.81 40.19 29.22 39.84 30.97 41.92 35.08 
Years of Educ. 11.23 8.551 12.19 8.837 13.79 9.983 12.58 7.184 
Married 0.804 0.420 0.836 0.501 0.857 0.616 0.864 0.761 
Head of hh 0.581 0.305 0.611 0.296 0.632 0.473 0.697 0.477 
Size of hh 5.327 6.626 4.857 6.175 4.448 5.103 4.403 4.556 
Urban hh 0.762 0.578 0.670 0.420 0.579 0.365 0.494 0.256 
Hh enterprise 0.220 0.355 0.130 0.186 0.119 0.118 0.0326 0.0712 
Work experience 19.87 13.50 19.10 13.26 20.92 16.16 19.64 15.38 
Union membership 0.574 0.0692 0.614 0.0309 0.446 0.0369 0.471 0.0209 
2nd occupation 0.116 0.0161 0.133 0.0287 0.128 0.0481 0.119 0.0440 
Table 2. Worker Characteristics Egypt – calculated from ELMPS (1998 – 2018) 
In line with the assumption made in the theoretical model, the informal worker wages across the 
four years remain consistently lower than those for formal workers. Prior to 2018, there are more men than 
women engaged in the informal employment. Zaki & Salem (2019) note the possibility that women 
generally have a lower labor participation rate in developing countries. This is also in line with the 
observations of both Aleman-Castilla (2007) for Mexico and Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003) for Columbia and 
Brazil. However, this gap seems to significantly shrink over time until 2018. This change may indicate a 
shift in cultural acceptance of women participating in the labor force with increase in available opportunities 
outside of the household, or it may signal a change in the definition of employment to include stay-at-home 
parents. Informal workers also tend to be younger, single, and less educated than their peers in the formal 
sector. Households of informal workers also tend to be located in urban areas, perhaps suggesting a large 




trend seems to disappear across time, with only a minimal difference in household size between sectors in 
the 2018 sample.  
In terms of work characteristics, it seems that there appears to be a decrease in the number of 
workers who operate a non-farm household enterprise in both the formal and informal sector. Moreover, a 
much larger portion of formal workers engage in a more than one income-generating activity outside of 
their main occupations. Finally, significantly more formal workers hold membership in trade or labor 
unions, with less than five percent of informal workers doing so across time.  
Now we turn to exploring these differences in the Kenyan labor force data. 
2. Kenya: Labor Force 
Table 3 provides the summary of sectoral differences by worker and job characteristic at the 
average level for all industries at three different points in time. We note the same trend in Kenya as that 
which is recorded for Egypt in terms of the formal-informal wage differential. While the formal wage 
increases more than two-fold from 1999 to 2005 (with a further 50% increase between 2005 and 2019), the 
informal wage initially declines before increasing between 2005 and 2019, with an overall increase for the 
two-decade period of roughly 180%. The wage difference between the two sectors therefore significantly 






 1999 2005 2019 
 Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Avg. Monthly 
Wage (KSH) 
9,367 4,603 22,190 3,058 33,428 12,945 
Being a Woman 0.311 0.509 0.323 0.457 0.343 0.537 
Age 36.90 35.86 39.51 35.70 39.25 37.69 
Married 0.809 0.626 0.924 0.880 0.773 0.637 
Years of Educ. 11.10 6.771 11.93 7.957 15.74 7.556 
Head of hh 0.714 0.439 0.737 0.457 0.735 0.458 
Size of hh 5.109 5.843 5.522 5.955 2.556 3.049 
Urban hh 0.402 0.107 0.605 0.274 0.623 0.336 
Table 3. Worker Characteristics Kenya - calculated from ILFS 1999, KIHBS 2005, KCHBS 2019 
While all other observations in terms of individual and work characteristics remain largely similar 
to those of Egypt’s labor force, informal workers are more likely to be women than men in Kenya. In light 
of this difference, it is important to note the significant difference in labor force participation rates for the 
two countries.25 Moreover, the difference in average age between formal and informal workers tends to be 
less pronounced in Kenya. These differences, as stated by Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003), reinforce the 
importance in controlling for individual characteristics when conducting our analysis of informal 
employment, to fully isolate the effect that industry affiliation has on informal employment. 
3. Tariff Data 
Before we attempt a preliminary analysis to link the level of informal employment to trade 
liberalization, we provide a brief analysis of overall and industry-level changes in tariffs over our period of 
interest. Table 4 and Table 5 in the Appendix 2 provide a quick overview of the overall tariff level changes 
in all industries between the beginning and end year in our analysis. There is a clear decline in average 
MFN tariff level across time for both Egypt and Kenya. While this may indicate a more liberalized approach 
 




to trade in general, the aggregate data may possibly hide shifts at the industry level. Figure 1 below provides 
an overview of the change in tariff level in different industries in Egypt. The 2-digit number refers to the 
ISIC rev. 3 2-digit level identification for the industry.  
 
Figure 1. Egypt - 1998 and 2018 tariff level by industry 
As can be observed from this graph, while there is an increase in tariff level for one particular 
industry (“64: Post and telecommunications"), there is a clear decrease in tariff levels for all other industries, 
as all but one of the plots are below the 45° line. Industries such as “1: Agriculture, hunting and related 
service activities,” “51: Wholesale trade and commission trade,” and “55: Hotels and restaurants,” as well 
as some manufacturing industries (e.g., 26, 27 and 28), have experienced some of the largest cuts in tariffs.  
It is thus clear that industry-level changes in tariffs are not uniform and some industries are more “open” 






Figure 2. Kenya - 1999 and 2016 tariff level by industry 
Similar to Egypt, most industry plots are below the 45° degree line, while a few industries—such 
as Agriculture, and "17: Manufacture of textiles"—appear to experience higher tariff levels at the end our 
period. Industries "65: Financial intermediation,” “28: Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment," and other manufacturing industries (15 – 36) have experienced the largest tariff 
cuts over the past two decades.26 With confirmation of tariff level changes at the industry level in both 
countries, we turn to the initial question:  Does tariff protection play some role in changing the level of 
informal employment within industries?  
D. Preliminary Analysis 
Table 4 below indicate the overall share of informal employment in total employment in Egypt and 
Kenya over the period studied. 
 
26 More figures exploring survey wave to next survey wave tariff comparison for both Kenya and Egypt are 




Share of Informal Workers in Egypt  Share of Informal Workers in Kenya 
1998 0.46978377  1999 0.91932607 
2006 0.52849924  2005 0.92844515 
2012 0.55601885  2019 0.93768546 
2018 0.72649985  Average 0.9303958 
Average 0.570200428    
Table 4. Share of informal employment in Egypt & Kenya 
While the growth in informal employment in both countries is clear (with a more pronounced 
increase for Egypt), the share of informal workers for Kenya is overall much larger than Egypt’s. It is of 
substance however to consider the difference in overall attitude the two country has in regard to informality. 
Over time, the Kenyan government adopted a more inclusive stance toward the country’s Jua Kali informal 
sector. Jua Kali now has its own category in the survey questions and its official reported statistics.  Such 
a category for employment and labor data does not exist in the Egypt dataset.  Consequently, the 
classification process that we conduct on the two surveys may capture informal employment in Kenya more 
effectively than it does for Egypt.27 
Despite the absolute differences described above, our ensuing inquiry ought to explore whether this 
growth in the share of informal workers in the two countries stems from (1) overall changes in industrial 
share of employment, i.e., increased formal employment opportunities (from trade liberalization) in another 
industry leads to higher labor force concentration in said-industry, or (2) from within-industry adjustments 
of the formal-informal share of employment, i.e., workers stay within the same industry but move from 
formal to informal employment. Since the basic premise of the Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) empirical 
model rests on the assumptions that within-industry change in informal employment exceeds changes 
between industries, it is essential to prove such is the case for both Egypt and Kenya. Following Goldberg  
and Pavcnik (2003), we therefore provide a decomposition of the overall change in the share of informal 
workers in total employment ∆𝐼 into within and between industry variations.  See Table 7 below.28 
 
27 While this may play a role in changing the final results of the empirical model, there is not much that can be done 
to fix this problem. 




  Total Within industries Between industries 
Egypt 0.20873623 0.114837281 0.093898949 
Kenya 0.011350457 0.060083288 -0.048732831 
Table 5. Within- and Between-industries change in informal employment 
One important (and striking) observation from the Table (7) is the negative value on the changes 
in informal employment across industries for Kenya. Indeed from the results, we see that formal 
employment in Kenya has grown across industries, i.e. formal employment in certain Kenyan industries 
has grown so significantly that it has drawn informal workers from other industries.29 However, the positive 
value of within-industry changes in informal employment in both countries clearly dominate the between 
industry shifts. This discovery allows us to proceed in exploring how trade liberalization within industries 
plays a role in the growth of informal employment.  
Now we attempt to establish a preliminary relationship between the increasing level of informality 
in both countries and trade liberalization that has taken place over the past two decades. Figures (3) and (4) 
below provide an overview of such a relationship for both countries by plotting the change in the share of 
informal workers to total employment and the change in overall tariff level across all industries.  
 
 
29 From our analysis, these industries are the “21: Manufacture of paper and paper products” and “15: Manufacture 
of food products and beverages.” 




As noted before, however, the aggregate level data can conceal changes and relationships at the 
industry level. Thus, we provide below a similar overview of the potential relationship between informality 
and trade liberalization at a disaggregated, industry level: 
In Appendix 2, we provide industry separated at the ISIC rev 3 level. While we observe an opposing 
relationship similar to that found in the aggregate level data in some industries like “Agriculture, Hunting 
and Forestry”, informal employment in industries like “Mining and quarrying” holds a more ambiguous 
relationship to tariff levels. As such, there is no clear, unambiguous conclusion about the possible impact 
of trade liberalization (in the form of tariff reduction) on informal employment, especially for within-
industry changes. A deeper analysis of the relationship between informality and trade liberalization must 
be conducted. 
E. Main Model: Trade and Informal Employment 
1. Methodology 
We use the Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) a two-step econometric analysis that has been used in 
other studies examining the relationship between trade and employment the informal employment in 
developing countries. We estimate an industry informality premium, expressed as the probability of an 
individual working in the informal sector due solely to the industrial affiliation of the worker. In the second 
step, we pool the premia overtime and regress them against the tariff data. 
In the first step, a probit model for the probability of being in informal employment is estimated. 30 
We control for the individual, household and regional characteristics by introducing a vector of variables 
including gender, age, marital status, household position, and education level: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐻𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for an individual 𝑖, in industry 𝑗, 
at year 𝑡 working in the informal sector and 0 otherwise.  
  
 
30 Goldberg & Pavnick (2003) uses a linear probability model. Selwaness & Zaki (2013) and Ben Salem & Zaki 




The independent variables are:  
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 a vector of variables for individual worker characteristics: being a woman (sex=1), age, marital 
status, education level, work experience and a quadratic term for work experience. 
𝐻𝑗𝑡 vector of variables for household characteristics: household size, being the head of household, 
being the second head of the household, whether the household is located in a rural or urban area, 
and the incidence of a non-farm household enterprise. 
𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡 a vector of industry dummy variable indicating worker 𝑖 industry. 
𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 the discrepancy term. 
 
Following Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) we assign one industry (52: Retail trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household goods) as the reference industry and omit its 
dummy variable.  The coefficients of interest (premia) are 𝛼𝑗𝑡, the industry informality differentials. They 
capture variations in informal employment explained by industry affiliation but not worker or household 
characteristics. 
We normalize these coefficients using the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step restricted 
least squares procedure. The normalization process re-expresses the informality differentials as deviations 
from the employment-share-weighted average of all the other informality differentials.  This prevents any 
effect of the omitted reference variable on the normalized informality differentials (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 
2003; Selwaness & Zaki, 2013).31 The normalized coefficients can then be interpreted as the percentage 
point difference in probability of informal employment for a worker in a given industry relative to an 
average worker in all industries with the same observable characteristics. 
In the second step, the normalized coefficients 𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡
∗  are pooled over time and are regressed on the 
trade related variables using a fixed-effects Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) weighted by the inverse of the 
estimated transformed variance:32 
𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝛽1𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2)  
  
 
31 Selwaness & Zaki (2013) provide a detailed and clear process of the normalization, which we provide in 
Appendix 3.  The breakdown of the actual process we use through STATA and MATLAB is also included within.  
32 The inverse of the variance of the informality estimates from the first step are used as weights; this puts more 





∗  the estimated industry coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑡 transformed and expressed as deviations from the 
employment-weighted average informality differential. 
𝑇𝑗𝑡 Average MFN Applied Ad-Valorem Tariff for industry 𝑗 at year 𝑡. Following Selwaness & 
Zaki (2013) and Ben Salem & Zaki (2017) but contrary to Goldberg & Pavnick (2003), we 
measure trade liberalization with applied tariffs only.33 
𝐷𝑗, 𝐷𝑡 Dummy variables controlling for industry and time. 
𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the discrepancy term. 
 
2. First-stage results 
While our main concern is to extract the informality differentials in order to complete the regression 
set in equation (2), the results in the first step can be useful in exploring the determinants of informal labor 
at the individual level. Tables (8) and (9) report the results for Kenya and Egypt, respectively.  
In both countries, the education variable has a statistically significant negative coefficient. This 
result suggests that more years of education reduces the probability of an individual being informally 
employed. Over the 20-year period from 1999 to 2019, the coefficient on the variable increases (becomes 
more negative) for Kenya and slightly less negative for Egypt. While this may portray a decrease in the role 
education plays for workers to avoid informality and find more stable and formal employment for Egypt, 
more analysis must be done to make such an inference.  
For Egypt, we also find that older workers are more likely to hold formal jobs that their younger 
counterparts. Thanks to the existence of work experience data in the Egyptian survey, we find a quadratic 
relationship between informal employment and work experience i.e. the likelihood of an individual holding 
an informal job is low in their earlier years in the labor force, but after a certain number of years the 
likelihood of taking on informal employment increases. This may indicate that even if workers seek formal 
jobs at first, since they seem to be the optimal choice, they may find that the benefits provided by formal 
employment are not enough or can be easily matched with informal employment.  
  
 
33 Goldberg & Pavnick (2003) also uses lagged and current values of trade flows which may cause an endogeneity 




Table 6. Egypt – Probit Model for Informality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 1998 2006 2012 2018 
     
sex 0.108 0.107 -0.208 -0.0554 
 (0.111) (0.104) (0.130) (0.0948) 
age -0.0359*** -0.0585*** -0.0384*** -0.0313*** 
 (0.00761) (0.00645) (0.00915) (0.00308) 
marstat -0.217** -0.199** -0.375*** -0.113 
 (0.100) (0.0973) (0.119) (0.0859) 
hhhead -0.0424 -0.239** 0.123 -0.0903 
 (0.110) (0.106) (0.121) (0.0891) 
hhhead2 -0.131 -0.201 0.218 -0.185 
 (0.170) (0.158) (0.197) (0.137) 
hhsize 0.0102 0.0130 0.0307* -0.00496 
 (0.0126) (0.0135) (0.0171) (0.0129) 
educyr -0.0994*** -0.0654*** -0.0889*** -0.0763*** 
 (0.0122) (0.00737) (0.0100) (0.00484) 
workxp -0.0500*** -0.0239** -0.0309** -0.0376*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.00578) 
workxp2 0.000854*** 0.000869*** 0.000732*** 0.000695*** 
 (0.000168) (0.000191) (0.000180) (0.000116) 
union -0.882*** -1.390*** -0.790*** -1.398*** 
 (0.0720) (0.0731) (0.0752) (0.0658) 
fament -0.197*** 0.0874 0.125 -0.165 
 (0.0736) (0.0806) (0.0920) (0.134) 
rururban -0.153** -0.131** -0.137** -0.0778* 
 (0.0723) (0.0601) (0.0572) (0.0409) 
Constant 4.077*** 4.302*** 3.953*** 3.708*** 
 (0.219) (0.199) (0.201) (0.134) 
     
Observations 4,478 6,989 6,580 9,795 
Joint F-test for Industry 
dummies 
P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Pseudo R2 0.612 0.706 0.690 0.594 
PctCorr 88.77 91.84 91.28 88.98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
For Kenya, interestingly, the variables indicating the head and second head of household position 
are both statistically significant and negative, which suggests they contradict the coefficient on gender. In 
the 1999 and 2019 surveys, women are more likely to hold an informal job; however, the co-head of 
household variable has a negative coefficient. When further exploring the dataset over the three years 
studied, there is no strong correlation between being a man and being the head of household, or being a 




We also find that for both countries, living in an urban area appears to decrease the chance of 
holding a job in the informal sector. However, the magnitude of the coefficient on this variable decreases 
in magnitude from 1998 to 2018, which may indicate a growing urban informal sector.  It is important to 
note that the inferences made above need to be confirmed with further analysis and are simple deductions 
made from the statistical results for the purpose of linking trade and informality. 
Moreover, as indicated in the row Joint F-test for Industry Dummies, industry indicators are always 
jointly statistically significant (most are individually statistically different from zero as well), indicating 
that in spite of individual worker and household characteristics, industry affiliation plays an important role 
in explaining employment within informal sector. While these results are not reported in the results within 
the thesis, the highest coefficients on industry dummies are for the sectors “1: Agriculture, hunting and 
related service activities”, “5: Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities 
incidental to fishing”, and “95: Private households with employed persons” for Egypt. For Kenya, they are 
“1: Agriculture, hunting and related service activities”, “14: Other mining and quarrying”, and “45: 
Construction”  for Kenya. This suggests that workers in the these industries are more likely to hold informal 
employment than the average worker across all other industries with the same household and individual 
characteristics.  
Lastly, before turning to linking trade and the industry informality differential in the second-stage 
of our analysis, we correlate the estimated industry informality differentials across time, per Aleman-
Castilla (2007) for Mexico and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) for Columbia and Brazil. We observe that for 
the year-to-year correlations of the informality differentials on the Egypt coefficient range from 0.851 to 
0.5851, with an overall average of 0.83418. The range for Kenya’s coefficient is 0.8248 to 0.6014, with an 
overall average of 0.8496.34 High correlation values could indicate lower sensitivity to changes in import 
tariffs, and the opposite for lower correlation values. It is possible, therefore, that changes in Kenya’s tariff 
 




levels will affect the likelihood of within-industry informality more than changes in Egypt’s, although the 
difference at the extreme and the mean are very small. 
Table 7. Kenya – Probit Model for Informality 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 1999 2005 2019 
    
sex 0.148*** 0.0198 0.160*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0541) (0.0429) 
age -0.00306 -0.00444** 0.00205 
 (0.00191) (0.00194) (0.00139) 
marstat -0.139** -0.0787 -0.188*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0745) (0.0436) 
educyr -0.0833*** -0.0818*** -0.115*** 
 (0.00616) (0.00631) (0.00325) 
hhhead -0.206*** -0.636*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0738) (0.0701) (0.0574) 
hhhead2 -0.115 -0.466*** -0.176** 
 (0.0934) (0.0801) (0.0736) 
hhsize -0.00885 -0.0281*** 0.0161* 
 (0.00681) (0.00749) (0.00895) 
rururban -0.209*** 0.0146 -0.287*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0471) (0.0331) 
Constant 3.395*** 3.893*** 4.039*** 
 (0.125) (0.137) (0.0987) 
    
Observations 20,049 16,897 29,150 
Joint F-test for Industry dummies P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Pseudo R2 0.522 0.502 0.495 
PctCorr 95.42 94.67 94.59 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3. Second–stage Results  
We find different results for the two countries in the second step of our main model and, thus, 
separate our discussion of the two countries.  
a. Egypt  
Table (10) reports the estimates of equation (2) for Egypt. Column (1) presents the obtained results 
for the tariff values at the year of completion of the surveys, while columns (2) and (3) present the results 
for 1-year and 2-year lagged tariff values, respectively. Our results are in line with the findings of Zaki 




level, i.e., trade liberalization is more likely to decrease within-industry levels of informal employment than 
to increase them. It is important to note, however, that the coefficients on both lagged tariff values are of 
very small magnitudes. Following Aleman-Castilla (2007)’s results interpretation, we find that a 1-
percetange point decline in the 1-year lagged tariff faced by a given industry35, reduces the probability of 
informal employment in said industry approximately by 0.006 percentage points36. The effect of tariff cuts 
on informality grows over time, with a much higher magnitude of the coefficient on the 2-year lagged tariff 
values. As such, while trade liberalization does a play a role in reducing informality in Egypt, the effect 
seems minimal and takes time to emerge.  
Table 8. Egypt: tariff and informality 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Informality Informality Informality 
    
tariff 0.00683   
 (0.00441)   
1 year lagged tariff  0.00603**  
  (0.00251)  
2 year lagged tariff   0.0198** 
   (0.00908) 
Constant 0.0208 0.0322 -0.00340 
 (0.0345) (0.0343) (0.0364) 
    
Observations 103 103 80 
R-squared 0.023 0.046 0.065 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b. Kenya 
Table (11) reports the estimates of equation (2) for Kenya.  Similar to our results for Egypt, the 
coefficient on the current tariff values is not statistically significant; however, column (2) indicates that 
tariff levels, a year prior to completion of the survey, do have an effect on informality levels. Unlike Egypt, 
the coefficients on the 1-year lagged tariff values are negative, indicating conformity with our theoretical 
model findings. This coefficient can be interpreted as a 1-percentage point decline in the tariff faced by a 
 
35 In comparison to the all-time average tariff for the given industry. 




given industry will increase the probability of informal employment in said-industry in the following year 
by approximately 0.009 percentage points.   
Table 9. Kenya: tariff and informality 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Informality Informality 
   
tariff -0.00496  
 (0.00698)  
1 year lagged tariff  -0.00968* 
  (0.00548) 
Constant 0.0328 0.0261 
 (0.0539) (0.0538) 
   
Observations 76 76 
R-squared 0.007 0.022 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
F. Extension to the Model: Formal-informal Wage Differential and Tariff  
In his investigation of the Mexican experience with NAFTA, Aleman-Castilla (2007) includes an 
analysis of both the relationship between informality and wages and the formal-informal wage differential.  
His model is based on Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2003).  We use his econometric equations to extend our main 
empirical model and explore any impact of Kenya’s and Egypt’s import tariff liberalization process on the 
wage differential. We do not include an analysis of the impact on wages in general for two reasons: (1) our 
theoretical findings put more emphasis on the impact on informal wages, since wages in the formal sector 
are assumed to be fixed; and (2) the descriptive statistics explored previously highlights the existence of a 
persistent formal-informal wage differential.  Our goal is to explore directly the incidence of this gap and 
the impact of lower tariff levels on the gap. 
In order to run our estimation for the extension, we use a log-wage equation (3) in place of equation 
(1): 





lg𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 the natural log value of the total monthly wage for worker 𝑖, in industry 𝑗 at time 𝑡 
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 a matrix of interaction terms between the vector of individual worker characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 
and the informality indicator 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 for worker 𝑖, in industry 𝑗 at time t, the independent 
variable from the main model 
𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡,  a matrix of interactions terms between the vector of household characteristics and the 
informality indicator. 
 
Other variables follow the same definitions as in equation (1). 
 
The coefficients 𝛼1×𝑓 and 𝛼2×𝑓 can be interpreted as the variation in wages explained by the 
difference in household, and individual worker characteristics between formal and informal workers.  
The main coefficients of interest are 𝛼𝑗𝑡×𝑓, which per Aleman-Castilla (2007) are designated as 
within-industry formal-informal wage differentials. Analogous to the process for the main empirical model, 
we estimate equation (3) separately for each year, and normalize the coefficients using the Haisken-Denew 
& Schmidt (1997) procedure. We then run a regression similar to the one as stipulated by equation (2) using 
the normalized coefficients as the independent variable: 
𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡
∗ = 𝛽1𝑇𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 (4)  
𝐼𝑃𝑗𝑡
∗  the estimated industry coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑡 transformed and expressed as deviations from the 
employment-weighted average informality differential. 
𝑇𝑗𝑡 Average MFN Applied Ad-Valorem Tariff for industry 𝑗 at year 𝑡. Following Selwaness & 
Zaki (2013) and Ben Salem & Zaki (2017) but contrary to Goldberg & Pavnick (2003), we 
measure trade liberalization with applied tariffs only.37 
𝐷𝑗, 𝐷𝑡 Dummy variables controlling for industry and time. 
𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the discrepancy term. 
 
1. First-stage results 
Tables (12) and (13) report the results for Egypt and Kenya, respectively.  The results suggest that 
while education in general can lead to higher income levels for both Kenyan and Egyptian workers, holding 
a job in the informal sector dampens this positive effect. In 2018, one more year of schooling only increases 
wages by 1.37 % for informal workers while the education effect is about 3.44% for Egyptian workers in 
 
37 Goldberg & Pavnick (2003) also uses lagged and current values of trade flows which may cause an endogeneity 




the formal sector (2.30% and 6.68% are the education effect for Kenyan informal and formal workers, 
respectively).38 
Secondly, the coefficient on the informality interaction term for gender for both countries indicates 
that, in addition to the overall gender-based wage gap, a woman working in the informal sector will earn 
less than the average man. This suggests an added layer of inequality that may face African women in its 
large informal sector. In 1999, Kenya women earned 14.61% less than their male counterparts, and this 
increases to 27.41% if they were working in the informal sector. By 2018, Egyptian women earned 20.62% 
less than men and working in the informal sector increases this gap to 42.35%. It is important to note, 
however, that while the coefficient on the gender variable and the informality interaction term becomes 
more significant over time for Egypt, the opposite is true for Kenya (the estimate on the interaction term 
actually becomes statistically insignificant for the 2019 survey).  
Finally, living in urban areas for both Kenya and Egypt leads to higher monthly wages.  However, 
while being an urban informal worker in Kenya can lead to higher level of income, the positive effect of 
the rural/ urban variable is dampened for Egyptian informal workers. In both countries, these observations  
become insignificant in the later data.   
  
 






Table 10. Egypt: wages and worker characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 1998 Extension 2006 Extension 2012 Extension 2018 Extension 
     
sex -0.105 -0.0442 -0.157*** -0.231*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0646) (0.0509) (0.0511) 
sexxinf 0.422*** -0.202* -0.185* -0.245*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.0833) 
age 0.0327*** 0.0202*** 0.0134*** 0.000948 
 (0.00434) (0.00414) (0.00399) (0.00197) 
agexinf -0.00352 -0.00387 0.00938 -0.00292 
 (0.00684) (0.00625) (0.00724) (0.00256) 
marstat -0.0347 0.146** -0.0961* -0.0611 
 (0.0632) (0.0638) (0.0533) (0.0541) 
marstatxinf 0.0529 -0.103 0.296*** 0.0986 
 (0.0928) (0.0945) (0.105) (0.0764) 
hhhead -0.0762 0.0972 0.0450 0.0382 
 (0.0656) (0.0648) (0.0522) (0.0563) 
hhhead2 -0.0405 0.0415 0.0596 0.0698 
 (0.0896) (0.0897) (0.0727) (0.0792) 
hhheadxinf 0.106 -0.0367 -0.115 -0.00163 
 (0.101) (0.0995) (0.107) (0.0790) 
hhhead2xinf -0.129 0.00888 -0.372* -0.138 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.196) (0.124) 
hhsize 0.00724 -0.0120 -0.00350 -0.0245*** 
 (0.00779) (0.00866) (0.00772) (0.00802) 
hhsizexinf -0.0300*** 0.000664 -0.0151 0.0173 
 (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0107) 
educyr 0.0805*** 0.0467*** 0.0532*** 0.0339*** 
 (0.00793) (0.00420) (0.00453) (0.00326) 
educyrxinf -0.0122 -0.0119* -0.0343*** -0.0209*** 
 (0.0113) (0.00705) (0.00821) (0.00409) 
workxp 0.0105 0.0288*** 0.0156*** 0.0149*** 
 (0.00671) (0.00688) (0.00598) (0.00413) 
workxp2 -0.000175 -0.000550*** -0.000243*** -0.000145* 
 (0.000122) (0.000118) (8.69e-05) (8.04e-05) 
workxpxinf 0.0236** -0.00280 -0.0157 0.00502 
 (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.00540) 
workxp2xinf -0.000740*** 1.78e-05 -2.39e-05 -0.000213** 
 (0.000169) (0.000183) (0.000150) (0.000104) 
union 0.0942*** 0.193*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0339) (0.0251) (0.0258) 
unionxinf -0.0568 -0.00524 -0.0116 -0.0273 
 (0.0919) (0.102) (0.0803) (0.0818) 
fament -0.0143 -0.0285 -0.0290 -0.0912 
 (0.0420) (0.0459) (0.0366) (0.0808) 
famentxinf -0.0546 -0.116 0.0738 0.218* 
 (0.0685) (0.0723) (0.0744) (0.119) 




 (0.0406) (0.0356) (0.0255) (0.0249) 
rururbanxinf -0.161** -0.233*** -0.0899* 0.0346 
 (0.0625) (0.0549) (0.0479) (0.0364) 
Constant 4.275*** 4.579*** 5.671*** 7.094*** 
 (0.101) (0.0989) (0.0866) (0.0601) 
     
Observations 4,152 6,285 4,826 6,273 
R-squared 0.463 0.335 0.231 0.128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.453 0.326 0.218 0.116 
F test Model 45 40.04 18.26 11.17 
Prob >F 0 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 11. Kenya: wages and worker characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 1999 Extension 2005 Extension 2019 Extension 
    
sex -0.158*** -0.0697 -0.0886* 
 (0.0609) (0.0749) (0.0467) 
sexxinf -0.137** -0.296*** -0.0695 
 (0.0691) (0.0816) (0.0504) 
age 0.0139*** 0.0157*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.00233) (0.00309) (0.00170) 
agexinf -0.00219 -0.00428 -0.00883*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00330) (0.00172) 
marstat 0.0535 -0.0394 0.0704 
 (0.0657) (0.0941) (0.0472) 
marstatxinf 0.0181 0.0259 -0.0387 
 (0.0742) (0.108) (0.0509) 
educyr 0.118*** 0.135*** 0.0647*** 
 (0.00629) (0.00861) (0.00340) 
educyrxinf -0.0495*** -0.00933 -0.0448*** 
 (0.00686) (0.00940) (0.00374) 
hhhead 0.132 0.262** 0.00581 
 (0.0815) (0.114) (0.0664) 
hhhead2 0.155 0.199 -0.0460 
 (0.106) (0.128) (0.0845) 
hhheadxinf 0.229** -0.137 0.140** 
 (0.0903) (0.119) (0.0691) 
hhhead2xinf 0.102 -0.0706 0.170* 
 (0.125) (0.136) (0.0898) 
hhsize 0.00819 0.0205** 0.00762 
 (0.00696) (0.00934) (0.00977) 
hhsizexinf -0.00263 -0.0223** -0.00617 
 (0.00814) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
rururban 0.220*** 0.152*** 0.0587* 
 (0.0424) (0.0584) (0.0355) 
rururbanxinf 0.157*** 0.285*** 0.0140 
 (0.0511) (0.0656) (0.0387) 
    
Constant 6.591*** 6.457*** 8.933*** 
 (0.0648) (0.0667) (0.0346) 
    
Observations 4,549 7,425 9,468 
R-squared 0.588 0.518 0.321 
Adjusted R-squared 0.581 0.514 0.316 
F test Model 85.16 118 62.46 
Prob >F 0 0 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 





2. Second-stage results 
Tables (14) and (15) present the results for the second-step regression of the extension of our 
empirical model. Similar to the interpretation in second-stage results section of the main model, Column 
(1) presents the obtained results for the tariff values at the year of completion of the surveys, while columns 
(2) and (3) present the results for 1-year and 2-year lagged tariff values, respectively. Unlike our results for 
within-industry share of informal employment, the results for both countries return statistically significant 
positive coefficients on the tariff and 1-year lagged tariff values. The findings of Aleman-Castilla (2007) 
for the case of Mexico indicates that a negative estimate means a decrease in tariffs will increase the formal-
informal wage differential. Therefore, our results suggest the opposite: namely, that tariff elimination or 
cuts can bring about a decrease in the formal-informal wage gap in both countries. Moreover, since both 
the lagged tariff values and the current tariff values are significant, it means that wages are somewhat 
flexible.39 
Table 12. Egypt: Tariff and Formal-informal wage differential 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Tariff 0.0150**   
 (0.00725)   
1 year lagged tariff  0.00826*  
  (0.00490)  
2 year lagged tariff   0.00426 
   (0.00903) 
Constant 0.0189 0.0215 -0.0509 
 (0.0452) (0.0456) (0.0453) 
    
Observations 103 103 80 
R-squared 0.061 0.056 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
39 It is important to note that since we calculate the total monthly wage value by adding basic 
salary, benefits, bonuses and other incentives, more permanent or stable income values such as basic 
salary could yield different results. We calculate wages in this manner, as formal wages significantly 





Table 13. Kenya: Tariff and Formal-informal wage differential 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
tariff 0.0114*  
 (0.00593)  
1 year lagged tariff  0.0178*** 
  (0.00457) 
Constant -0.0288 -0.0236 
 (0.0326) (0.0272) 
   
Observations 76 76 
R-squared 0.087 0.191 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In summary, the preliminary analysis combined with the results from the two econometric models 
offer the following conclusions: 
• From the preliminary analysis, the overall share of informal workers to total employment in both 
Kenya and Egypt has grown significantly over the period studied. The ratio of informal workers in 
Egypt started at lower levels in the early 2000s and increased in a more pronounced manner than 
in the case of Kenya. However, more than 90% of Kenyan workers have had informal jobs since 
the early 2000s. 
• The relationship between a change in tariff level and the level of informal employment differs by 
industry. This variation calls for a deeper empirical analysis of the question on the relationship 
between informality and trade liberalization.  
• The first-stage results for the main empirical model suggest the likelihood of informal employment 
decreases with age and education for both Egyptian and Kenyan workers. Work experience also 
tends to lower the probability of working in the informal sector. However, this relationship is not 
linear, as seen in the quadratic term for work experience. This means that Egyptian workers are 
more likely to experience informal employment in the later years of their work force participation. 




living in urban areas are less likely to have informal jobs; however, this relationship weakens over 
time, which may indicate a growing urban informal sector during our period of study. 
• The second-stage results of our main model point to differences between Egypt and Kenya. For 
Egypt, tariff levels seem to exhibit a positive relationship with within-industry share of informal 
employment. In other words, trade liberalization in the form of tariff cuts decreases the likelihood 
of informal employment in a given industry. The opposite appears to hold for Kenya, where trade 
liberalization increases the chance of informal employment in given industries. This effect, 
however, appears to take time, because lagged tariff values are statistically significant whereas 
current tariffs are not. 
• Extending our model to analyze the relationship between tariff levels and the formal-informal wage 
differential, we find similar results for both countries: both the current tariff and lagged tariff values 
hold statistically significant positive values. This means that trade liberalization appears to reduce 
the wage differences between the informal and formal sectors for both Kenya and Egypt.  
We now return to our theoretical findings and link them to the empirical results in order to elaborate 





V. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
In this section, we seek to relate our theoretical findings to our empirical results in order to draw 
broader lessons from our study and to acknowledge its limitations. 
Our theoretical analysis suggests a certain ambiguity in how trade liberalization can affect the 
informal sector. The possible outcomes may depend on the relative importance of the formal sector (as 
measured in terms of the share of the workforce employed in formal production), the nature of the linkages 
between formal and informal production, and the relative capital intensity between the different segments 
of the informal sector.  
Our theoretical findings can be summarized as follows:   
(1) Trade liberalization in the form of tariff reduction can bring about an increase in the informal 
wage, thus putting downward pressure on the formal-informal wage differential and lessening labor market 
inequality. However, this is accompanied by an increase in informal employment and thereby can be seen 
as working against the goal of formalizing the economy. 
(2) Tariff reduction can also lead to a decrease in wages in the informal sector along with an 
increase in the level of informal employment, with the effect being magnified if the formal sector employs 
a large portion of the labor force. In this case, neither the goal of formalizing the economy nor the goal of 
addressing wage inequality is achieved. 
While our empirical study also suggests the possibility of differing outcomes of trade liberalization 
on informal employment, it finds that lowering tariffs can lessen wage inequality in both countries. More 
specifically:  
(3) For Egypt, there is a positive relationship between tariff levels and within-industry share of 
informal employment. In other words, trade liberalization in the form of tariff cuts decreases the likelihood 
of informal employment in a given industry.  
(4) For Kenya, trade liberalization increases the chance of informal employment in given industries.  
(5) A lower tariff reduces the wage differential between the formal and informal sectors in both 




On the one hand, the empirical results for Kenya support our theoretical finding stated in 
proposition one above: while the effect may take time to emerge, tariff reduction puts upward pressure on 
the likelihood of informal employment within industries. On the other hand, we observe that our theoretical 
model does not validate the empirical findings for Egypt. There is no scenario in our theoretical analysis in 
which the likelihood of informal employment decreases with trade liberalization, which is true for the 1-
year and 2-year lagged Egyptian tariff values.  
These differences point to some of the limitations of our theoretical model. The structure of the two 
economics are not equally well represented in our model. For example, unlike Kenya’s massive informal 
cross-border trade (Gor, 2012), Egypt has very little informal cross-border trade (Timmis, 2017). This could 
mean that in our theoretical model, 𝑌 is better represented in the case of Egypt as a formal exportable good 
that uses low-skilled labor (but formal capital). With trade liberalization, 𝑌 could have expanded at the 
expense of both the import-competing formal good 𝑋 and the informal intermediate good 𝑁. This could be 
exemplified by Egypt’s experience with the 1999 Qualified Industrial Zones Agreement with Israel and the 
US. Egyptian exporters benefit from duty-free treatment in the US when they use Israeli intermediate goods, 
which themselves enter Egypt duty-free (Ghoneim, 2009). This type of agreement offers “import 
liberalization” for certain industries and can therefore expand formal employment opportunities in said-
industries. 
In terms of the results on the formal-informal wage differential, both Zaki and Selwaness (2013) 
and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) argue that the relationship between tariff liberalization and informality 
depends on the degree of labor marker flexibility. For example, while not ideal for the workers in the formal 
sector, as per our theoretical model, a lowering of the fixed wage 𝑊 will decrease the relative cost of labor 
(i.e., a lower 
𝑊
𝑅
) in the production of the formal good 𝑋, increase the formal sector’s demand for labor and 
thus attract some workers from the informal sector. As elaborated by Selwaness, Zaki and Wahba (2009), 
Egypt’s 2003 labor law sought to reduce labor market rigidity and thus may have induced a lowering of 




formal-informal wage differential, whether the informal wage increased or the formal wage decreased is 
uncertain.  
As for Kenya, a large portion of its Jua Kali sector is composed of thriving entrepreneurs and self-
employed workers (House, 1984; Heintz and Valodia, 2008). Moreover, this sector appears to have 
expanded in both good times and bad times for the formal sector. This may be due to several factors specific 
to Kenya, such as the government’s more inclusive approach in its treatment of the informal sector insofar 
as increasing its access to financial tools and instruments. Indeed, Kenya is the African pioneer and leader 
in mobile payments through its mobile payment system M-PESA. In the late 1990s, less than 0.1% the 
country’s adult population had mobile phone service. By the end of 2011, more than 90% of Kenyan 
households owned a mobile phone. Studies credit this breakthrough to the M-PESA mobile-banking 
network and to the positive income-redistributive effect of the growth in information and communication 
technologies (Demombynes and Thegeya, 2012). More generally, in the case of Kenya, and especially in 
more recent years, our theoretical assumption of complete capital immobility between the two sectors of 
the economy limits the explanatory power of our model. Advances in microfinance (also nonfinance), 
small-scale banking schemes, and the expansion of financial instruments available to a wider public, have 
permitted a more integrated economy, allowing for financial capital to flow between the informal and 
formal sectors.  
Lastly, we can look to specific policy differences between Kenya and Egypt to shed light on some 
of our other empirical results. Take for example the differences in the coefficients on gender between the 
two countries in our first-stage results. Kenyan women are not only more likely to work in the informal 
sector, but also suffer an added gender income gap specific to the informal sector (in addition to the 
economy-wide gender wage gap). However, this informal sector gender wage gap has decreased over time 
and becomes statistically insignificant by 2018. A survey exploring the impact of women entrepreneurship 
on economic growth in Kenya found that with changing societal norms and easier access to microfinance, 
women choose to start their own enterprises in order to create a more favorable work environment than the 




In contrast, while Egyptian women are less likely to work in the informal sector than men, the 
gender wage gap – both economy-wide and informal sector specific --- has grown in magnitude and become 
more statistically significant. With the increasing participation rate of women in the labor force, Egyptian 
policymakers may wish to consider the experience of Kenya in order to avoid a further widening gender 
wage gap and to meet their own development goals as expressed in Egypt’s 2030 Vision plan (El-
Megharbel, 2015). 
What these examples point to is the importance of being cautious (or circumspect) in drawing 
general lessons from our study. The impact of trade reforms in Kenya or Egypt may not suggest how such 
reforms will play out across the continent when considering informality in general. What our results suggest 
is a need to dig deeper and in the future to consider how trade liberalization interacts with other domestic 
policy reforms or new economic initiatives. What we can argue is that Egypt and Kenya in their own efforts 
to expand economic activity (through support for women entrepreneurs or encouraging labor market 
flexibility) can present model cases for other African countries insofar as they combine trade policy with 
other policy reforms to increase the likelihood that trade liberalization processes will bring about positive 
outcomes for workers in the informal sector. However, such considerations are beyond the scope of this 






 This thesis has explored the relationship between the trade liberalization process, with an emphasis 
on tariff reduction, and employment and wage level within the informal sector of a “typical” African 
economy. The mechanism through which tariff reforms impact the informal sector is mapped using a simple 
general equilibrium model à la Marjit (2003). The model incorporates a traded import-competing formal 
sector that uses domestic intermediates produced by a segment of the informal sector, as well as another 
segment of the informal sector that uses imported intermediates to produce an exportable good. The latter 
is used to portray the incidence of large cross border informal trade, especially in the Sub-Saharan 
experience. Assuming sector-specific capital and a fixed higher wage for workers in the formal sector, the 
theoretical model predicts that tariff reduction leads to an increase in the level of employment in the 
informal sector, and could lead to an increase in the wages earned by informal workers. The latter 
conclusion is dependent on the condition that (1) the formal sector holds a small share of the labor force 
and (2) the informal segment producing the domestic intermediate is relatively more capital intensive. Our 
econometric analysis empirically confirms the theoretical perspective for Kenya, but not for Egypt: A 
negative relationship between MFN tariff levels and the likelihood of within-industry informal employment 
is found for Kenya, and a positive one is estimated for Egypt. That is, reducing the tariff facing Kenyan 
industries increases the likelihood of informal employment within those industries, while the opposite is 
true for Egyptian industries.  
 Moreover, in contrast to the findings of Aleman-Castilla (2007) for the Mexican experience with 
NAFTA, the extension to our main empirical model presents evidence of a contracting effect of tariff 
reduction on the formal-informal wage differential. In our work with the country-level survey data, we also 
find that a non-negligible share of the workers in the informal sector have more income-generating activities 
outside their main occupation. As such, it may be of interest for future research to consider other variables 
beyond the formal-informal binary to measure workers’ association with the informal sector and to 
investigate how that change may impact the effects of economic reforms such as trade liberalization on the 




 Lastly, future work may wish to return to the specification of the theoretical model to explore the 
implications of an expanded formal sector.  In our model, the formal sector produced only one good, the 
import-competing good X.  It would be interesting to introduce a second segment to the formal sector (much 
as we had done for the informal sector) in which a formal exportable good is produced.  Alternatively, while 
maintaining the structure of the two sectors of the economy as originally specified, future researchers could 
explore the implications of imperfect capital mobility to acknowledge what some African countries, such 
as Kenya, have been able to achieve in terms of financial market innovations.  In both cases, however, the 
suggested changes lead to a more complex model that may be difficult to solve. It is a challenge that was 





Appendix 1. Theoretical Model Algebraic Derivations40 
 
Our initial set of equations are such that: 
𝑊𝑎𝐿𝑋 + 𝑅𝑎𝐾𝑋 + 𝑎𝑁𝑋𝑃𝑁 = 𝑃𝑋 (1) 
𝑤𝑎𝐿𝑌 + 𝑟𝑎𝐾𝑌 + 𝑎𝑀𝑌𝑃𝑀 = 𝑃𝑌 (2) 
𝑤𝑎𝐿𝑁 + 𝑟𝑎𝐾𝑁 = 𝑃𝑁 (3) 
𝑎𝐿𝑋𝑋 + 𝑎𝐿𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐿𝑁𝑁 = 𝐿 (4) 
𝑎𝐾𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐾𝑁𝑁 = 𝐾𝐼 (5) 
𝑎𝐾𝑋𝑋 = 𝐾𝐹 (6) 
𝑎𝑁𝑋𝑋 = 𝑁 (7) 
𝐸𝐷(𝑁) = 𝑁𝑑 − 𝑁𝑆 = 0 (9) 
The steps we follow are 
Given PN, get R from (1)………………………………………………………………………….……….65 
Get X, from (6) ………………………………………………………………………….………..……….67 
Diff. (2), (3); get w,r=f(PN) ……………………………………………………………………………….67 
Diff. (4), (5); substitute σX,σY,σN, to get N,Y=fPN…………………………………………….……….69 
Lemma: factor substitutions……………………………………………………………………………….69 
Differentiating (4), ……………………………………………………………………………….……….70 
Differentiating (5), KI=0………………………………………………………………………….……….71 
Solving for Y, …………………………………………………………………………………….……….72 
Solving for N, …………………………………………………………………………………….……….72 
Substituting R, w,r: ……………………………………………………………………………….……….73 
Y=f(PN) …………………………………………………………………………………………..……….74 
N=f(PN) …………………………………………………………………………………………..……….75 
Differentiating (7) to get DN=aNXX……………………………………………………………..……….77 
Solving for PN in ND=NS………………………………………………………………………...……….78 




40 I would like to thank Professor Paula Russo of the Trinity College Mathematics Department for providing a 




1. Given 𝑷𝑵, get 𝑹 from (1) 
Differentiating (1) 
𝑎𝐿𝑋𝑑𝑊 + 𝑊𝑑𝑎𝐿𝑋 + 𝑎𝐾𝑋𝑑𝑅 + 𝑅𝑑𝑎𝐾𝑋 + 𝑎𝑁𝑋𝑑𝑃𝑁 + 𝑃𝑁𝑑𝑎𝑁𝑋 = 𝑑𝑃𝑋 












































, and similarly for 𝜃𝐾𝑋, 𝜃𝐿𝑌, and so on. 
𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂?𝐿𝑋 + 𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂? + 𝜃𝐾𝑋?̂?𝐾𝑋 + 𝜃𝐾𝑋?̂? + 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁𝑋 + 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁 = 0 
And thanks to the “envelope” conditions,  
𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂?𝐿𝑋 + 𝜃𝐾𝑋?̂?𝐾𝑋 = 0 
and since ?̂?𝑁𝑋 = 0 
We have, 
𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂? + 𝜃𝐾𝑋?̂? + 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁 = ?̂?𝑋 (1.1) 
























2. Get 𝑿, from (6) 
Differentiating (6), 
𝑎𝐾𝑋𝑋 = 𝐾𝐹 
𝜆𝐾𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑋?̂?𝐾𝑋 = ?̂?𝐹 
Similarly to 𝜃𝐿𝑋, 𝜆𝐾𝑋 =
𝑎𝐾𝑋𝑋
𝐾
, and similarly for 𝜃𝐾𝑋, 𝜃𝐿𝑌, and so on. 
 
We know that ?̂?𝐹 = 0, 
?̂? = −?̂?𝐾𝑋 (6.1) 
3. Diff. (2), (3); get 𝒘, 𝒓 = 𝒇(𝑷𝑵) 
Differentiating (2), (3) and using envelope conditions, 
𝜃𝐿𝑌?̂? + 𝜃𝐾𝑌?̂? + 𝜃𝑀𝑌?̂?𝑀 = ?̂?𝑌 (2.1) 
𝜃𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜃𝐾𝑁?̂? = ?̂?𝑁 (3.1) 
For a given 𝑃𝑁, using 2.1 – 3.1, we solve for ?̂?, and ?̂? 
We know that 𝑃?̂? = 0, and ?̂?𝑀 = 0, solving for ?̂?, and ?̂? 
−{
𝜃𝐾𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑌?̂? + 𝜃𝐾𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑌?̂? = 0
𝜃𝐾𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜃𝐾𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑁?̂? = 𝜃𝐾𝑌?̂?𝑁
 
−{
𝜃𝐿𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑌?̂? + 𝜃𝐿𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑌?̂? = 0
𝜃𝐿𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜃𝐿𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑁?̂? = 𝜃𝐿𝑌?̂?𝑁
 
𝜃𝐾𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑌?̂? − 𝜃𝐾𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑁?̂? = −𝜃𝐾𝑌?̂?𝑁 





































?̂?(𝜃𝐿𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑌 − 𝜃𝐿𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑁) = −𝜃𝐿𝑌?̂?𝑁 













4. Diff. (4), (5); substitute 𝝈𝑿, 𝝈𝒀, 𝝈𝑵, to get 𝑵,𝒀 = 𝒇(𝑷𝑵) 
a. Lemma: factor substitutions 
We assume the intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions without any substitutions with K or L. 









𝜎𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?) = ?̂?𝐾𝑌 − ?̂?𝐿𝑌 




As such,  
𝜎𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?) = −
𝜃𝐿𝑌
𝜃𝐾𝑌
?̂?𝐿𝑌 − ?̂?𝐿𝑌 → 𝜎𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?) = −?̂?𝐿𝑌 (
𝜃𝐿𝑌
𝜃𝐾𝑌
+ 1) → 𝜎𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?)
= −?̂?𝐿𝑌 (
𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜃𝐾𝑌(= 1)
𝜃𝐾𝑌









Which can be re-written as, 
?̂?𝐾𝑋 = 𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋(?̂? − ?̂?)
?̂?𝐿𝑋 = −𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐾𝑋(?̂? − ?̂?)
} (10.1) 
?̂?𝐾𝑌 = 𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?)
?̂?𝐿𝑌 = −𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?)
} (11.1) 
?̂?𝐾𝑁 = 𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)






b. Differentiating (4), 
And since, ?̂? = 0 
𝑎𝐿𝑋𝑋 + 𝑎𝐿𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐿𝑁𝑁 = 𝐿 (4) 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂?𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂?𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑋?̂? − 𝜆𝐿𝑋?̂?𝐿𝑋 (4.1) 
Substituting ?̂? from (6.1), 
?̂? = −?̂?𝐾𝑋 (6.1) 
We get, 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂?𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂?𝐿𝑁 + 𝜆𝐿𝑋?̂?𝐾𝑋 − 𝜆𝐿𝑋?̂?𝐿𝑋  
Substituting ?̂?𝐾𝑋 and ?̂?𝐿𝑋, and since ?̂? = 0 
?̂?𝐾𝑋 = 𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋(?̂? − ?̂?) = −𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂?
?̂?𝐿𝑋 = −𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐾𝑋(?̂? − ?̂?) = 𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐾𝑋?̂?
}  
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂?𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂?𝐿𝑁 + 𝜆𝐿𝑋?̂?𝐾𝑋 − 𝜆𝐿𝑋?̂?𝐿𝑋 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂?𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂?𝐿𝑁 + 𝜆𝐿𝑋(−𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂?) − 𝜆𝐿𝑋(𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐾𝑋?̂?) 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂?𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂?𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂? − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐾𝑋?̂? 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂?𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂?𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂?(𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜃𝐿𝑋) 
We know that, 







Thus, we have, 






?̂?𝐾𝑌 = 𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?)
?̂?𝐿𝑌 = −𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?)
} (11.1) 
?̂?𝐾𝑁 = 𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)
?̂?𝐿𝑁 = −𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)
} (12.1) 
Substituting, ?̂?𝐿𝑁 and ?̂?𝐿𝑌, we have, 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂?𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂?𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?) + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = (?̂? − ?̂?)(𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁) − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? (4.2) 
Now using (10.1 – 12.1), 
c. Differentiating (5), ?̂?𝑰 = 𝟎 
𝑎𝐾𝑌𝑌 + 𝑎𝐾𝑁𝑁 = 𝐾𝐼 (5) 
𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = −(𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂?𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂?𝐾𝑁) (5.1) 
Now consider: 
?̂?𝐾𝑌 = 𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?)
?̂?𝐿𝑌 = −𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?)
} (11.1) 
?̂?𝐾𝑁 = 𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)
?̂?𝐿𝑁 = −𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)
} (12.1) 
Substituting ?̂?𝐾𝑁, ?̂?𝐾𝑌, we have, 
𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂?𝐾𝑌 − 𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂?𝐾𝑁 
𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?) 







d. Solving for ?̂?, 
Define, 
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁 = 𝛿𝐾 > 0 
𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁 = 𝛿𝐿 > 0 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = (?̂? − ?̂?)(𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁) − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? (4.2) 
𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = −(?̂? − ?̂?)(𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁) 
𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = (?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐿 − 𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? (4.2) 
𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = −(?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐾 (5.2) 
−{
𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = 𝜆𝐾𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐿 − 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂?
𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐾
 
𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? − 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = 𝜆𝐾𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐿 − 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐾 
?̂?(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌) = 𝜆𝐾𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐿 − 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑁(?̂? − ?̂?)𝛿𝐾 
?̂? =
𝜆𝐾𝑁𝛿𝐿(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝛿𝐾(?̂? − ?̂?)
𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌 = −|𝜆|
 
e. Solving for ?̂?, 
−{
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑌?̂? = 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝛿𝐿(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂?
𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑌?̂? = −𝜆𝐿𝑌𝛿𝐾(?̂? − ?̂?)
 
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑁?̂? − 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑁?̂? = 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝛿𝐿(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝛿𝐾(?̂? − ?̂?) 
?̂?(𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑁) = 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝛿𝐿(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝛿𝐾(?̂? − ?̂?) 
?̂? =
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝛿𝐿(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝛿𝐾(?̂? − ?̂?)

































(𝑎𝐾𝑌𝑎𝐿𝑁 − 𝑎𝐾𝑁𝑎𝐿𝑌) 
Now consider, 
?̂? = ?̂? =
𝜆𝐾𝑁𝛿𝐿(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝛿𝐾(?̂? − ?̂?)
𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌 − 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌 = −|𝜆|
=




𝜆𝐾𝑌𝛿𝐿(?̂? − ?̂?) − 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋?̂? + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝛿𝐾(?̂? − ?̂?)
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜆𝐾𝑁
=







g. 𝒀 = 𝒇(𝑷𝑵) 
?̂? =

















?̂?𝑁) (𝜆𝐾𝑁𝛿𝐿 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝛿𝐾) + (
𝜃𝐿𝑌
|𝜃|

















































• Recall that,  
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁 = 𝛿𝐾 
𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁 = 𝛿𝐿 
 
𝜆𝐾𝑁𝛿𝐿 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝛿𝐾 = 𝜆𝐾𝑁(𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁) + 𝜆𝐿𝑁(𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁) 
= 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁 




(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁)?̂?𝑁 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
1
|𝜆|𝜃𝐾𝑋








































































































• Recall that,  
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁 = 𝛿𝐾 































































































5. Differentiating (7) to get 𝑫𝑵 = 𝒂𝑵𝑿𝑿 














𝜆𝑁𝑋?̂?  + 𝜆𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁𝑋 = ?̂? 
We know that ?̂?𝑁𝑋 = 0, and from (6) ?̂? = −?̂?𝐾𝑋 
Thus, 
?̂? = −𝜆𝑁𝑋?̂?𝐾𝑋 
And ?̂?𝐾𝑋 = 𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂? − 𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂? and because ?̂? = 0, then ?̂?𝐾𝑋 = −𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂? 
We get, 
?̂? = 𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋?̂? 
Substituting ?̂?, we get, 


















6. Solving for 𝑷𝑵 in 𝑵
𝑫 = 𝑵𝑺 













?̂?𝐷 = ?̂? = (
𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋
𝜃𝐾𝑋





?̂?𝐷 = ?̂? = (
𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋
𝜃𝐾𝑋


























































































































































7. Stability condition (Following Marjit (2003)) 





























Has to be positive i.e. 
(








) > 0 
This entails that even when |𝜆| < 0 → 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
𝜃𝑁𝑋
𝜃𝐾𝑋|𝜆|
















8. Comparative Statics 
?̂?𝑁 =
𝜎𝑋𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋|𝜆||𝜃| + 𝜎𝑋𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋|𝜃|
























(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁)?̂?𝑁 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
1
|𝜆|𝜃𝐾𝑋
(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 
|𝜃|, |𝜆| must have the same sign. If |𝜆| = 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑁 − 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌 > 0  






∶ 𝑌 is more 𝐾-intensive than 𝑁 





Proof of Proposition 2:  
Case I: |𝜆|, |𝜃| > 0 i.e. 𝑌 is capital intensive relative to N 
?̂?𝑁 =
𝜎𝑋𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋|𝜆||𝜃| + 𝜎𝑋𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋|𝜃|
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋|𝜆||𝜃|𝜃𝑁𝑋 + 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋|𝜃|𝜃𝑁𝑋
?̂?𝑋 
 
?̂?𝑋 < 0 → ?̂?𝑁 < 0 by coefficient on ?̂?𝑋 above.  
 







































𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋
𝜃𝑁𝑋




𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋
𝜃𝑁𝑋
+ 1
?̂?𝑋 < ?̂?𝑋 
Thus we can conclude that, 
𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁 < ?̂?𝑋 in their absolute value. 
Furthermore, if ?̂?𝑋 < 0 → ?̂?𝑁 < 0 i.e. ?̂?𝑋 has the same sign (direction of change) as 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁. Thus 
the two have contradicting effects with (?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁). However, as proven above, the negative effect of 








(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 
The negative impact is greater in magnitude than the positive effect. There will be a net decrease 
𝑅 unambiguously 
Impact on informal wages: 




?̂?𝑋 < 0 → ?̂?𝑁 < 0 → ?̂? < 0 unambiguously  





?̂?𝑋 < 0 → ?̂?𝑁 < 0 → ?̂? > 0 unambiguously 
By the assumption of 𝑌 being 𝐾- intensive, 𝜃𝐾𝑌 > 𝜃𝐿𝑌 as such, |?̂?| > |?̂?| i.e. wages in the informal 
sector will decrease in greater magnitude than the increase in informal rents.  
Impact on Y production: 
• ?̂? = −
1
|𝜆||𝜃|
(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁)?̂?𝑁 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
1
|𝜆|𝜃𝐾𝑋
(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 




(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) < 0, therefore ?̂? is ambiguous.  




(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) ≅ 0, and consequently, ?̂? > 0.  
While further comparison is needed when 𝜆𝐾𝑁 ≠ 0, it is not improbable to conclude an increase in 
𝑌 production due to a decrease in 𝑃𝑋 .  
Summary of case I 
?̂? < 0, ?̂? < 0, ?̂? > 0 
?̂? is ambiguous but ?̂? > 0 if 𝜆𝐾𝑁 ≅ 0 




Case 2: |𝜆|, |𝜃| < 0 i.e.  𝑌 is labor-intensive relative to 𝑁 
?̂?𝑁 =
𝜎𝑋𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋|𝜆||𝜃| + 𝜎𝑋𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋|𝜃|
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐿𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑁𝜃𝐾𝑋 + 𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜎𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋|𝜆||𝜃|𝜃𝑁𝑋 + 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋|𝜃|𝜃𝑁𝑋
?̂?𝑋 
 


















As can be noted here, 
(1) if |𝜆| < 0 and 𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋 is substantial enough that |𝜆𝑁𝑋𝜃𝐿𝑋| < |
𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜆𝐿𝑋
|𝜆|
|, then ?̂?𝑋 < 0 → ?̂?𝑁 > 0.  
(2) Otherwise, ?̂?𝑋 < 0 → ?̂?𝑁 < 0. 
Case (2) is more likely to happen than case (1) since the assumption of 𝑌 being 𝐿-intensive means 
that 𝜆𝐾𝑌 will be small, and will definitely occur if 𝜆𝐾𝑌 ≅ 0. 
Subcase (1): ?̂?𝑿 < 𝟎 → ?̂?𝑵 > 𝟎 




(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 
With ?̂?𝑋 < 0, and ?̂?𝑁 > 0, (?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) < 0. As such there will be an unambiguous decrease in 
𝑅 – even more substantial than the negative effect if 𝑌 is 𝐾-intensive. 
Impact on informal wage: 




|𝜃| < 0, ?̂?𝑁 > 0 → ?̂? < 0 





|𝜃| < 0, ?̂?𝑁 > 0 → ?̂? > 0 




|𝜃𝐿𝑌| > |𝜃𝐾𝑌|, therefore |?̂?| < |?̂?| i.e. informal rents will increase in greater magnitude than wages 
in the informal sector will fall. 
Impact on Y production: 
• ?̂? = −
1
|𝜆||𝜃|
(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁)?̂?𝑁 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
1
|𝜆|𝜃𝐾𝑋
(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 
Since  
|𝜆| < 0, (?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) < 0 → 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
1
|𝜆|𝜃𝐾𝑋
(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) > 0 
|𝜆|, |𝜃| < 0, ?̂?𝑁 > 0 → −
1
|𝜆||𝜃|
(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁)?̂?𝑁 < 0 
Thus, the impact on 𝑌 is ambiguous and will depend on the comparison of the two terms above.  
If 𝜆𝐿𝑋 ≅ 0 i.e. the formal sector is very capital-intensive then there will be a net decrease in 𝑌. 
Subcase (2): ?̂?𝑿 < 𝟎 → ?̂?𝑵 < 𝟎 




(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 
Thus there will be a unambiguous net decrease in 𝑅, as (?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) < 0. 
 
Impact on informal wages: 




|𝜃| < 0, ?̂?𝑁 < 0 → ?̂? > 0 unambiguously.  





|𝜃| < 0, ?̂?𝑁 < 0 → ?̂? < 0 unambiguously. 
By the assumption of 𝑌 being 𝐿- intensive, 𝜃𝐿𝑌 > 𝜃𝐾𝑌 as such, |?̂?| < |?̂?| i.e. informal rents will 
decline in greater magnitude than informal wages will decline.. 




• ?̂? = −
1
|𝜆||𝜃|
(𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐾𝑌 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜆𝐾𝑌𝜎𝑌𝜃𝐿𝑌 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑁𝜎𝑁)?̂?𝑁 + 𝜆𝐾𝑁𝜆𝐿𝑋𝜎𝑋
1
|𝜆|𝜃𝐾𝑋
(?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) 
|𝜆||𝜃| < 0, ?̂?𝑁 < 0, (?̂?𝑋 − 𝜃𝑁𝑋?̂?𝑁) < 0 →  ?̂? > 0 
There will be an unambiguous increase in 𝑌 which comes as both 𝑋 and 𝑁 both contract; labor is 
squeezed out of the formal sector as formal wages cannot decline, and it leaves the non-traded sector as 




Appendix 2. Empirical Chapter (Descriptive Statistics, Preliminary Analysis and Econometric 
Equations) 
 
1. ISIC rev. 2, ISIC rev. 4 to ISIC rev.3 / 3.1 remap 
We remap the original classification of ISIC rev. 2 and ISIC rev. 4 in the Egyptian and Kenyan Labor 
force data, as well as average the tariff values from the trade data in the following manner: 
The original values of ISIC rev. 4 and rev. 2 are in column (1) and (2) respectively.  
- If the industry affiliation is not coded according to ISIC rev. 3, we create a new variable to store a 
2-digit truncated value of the ISIC code provided in the labor force dataset. We then ask STATA 
to create a new variable to store the final ISIC 3 remap if the truncated variable of the original ISIC 
is equal to either of the values in column (1) or (2). 
- If industry affiliation is already coded according to ISIC rev. 3, we create a new variable to truncate 
the code at the 2-digit level. We then ask STATA to create a new variable to store the final ISIC 3 
remap value according to the remap and combinations stated in column (3) and (4). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Original ISIC 4 
Division 
Original ISIC 2 
Division 
Final ISIC 3/ 3.1 
Division Category 
Other ISIC 3 
Divisions Combined 
with Remap 
1 11 1  
2 12 2  
3 13 5  
5 21 10  
6 22 11  
7 23 13  
8 29 14  
9  14  
10 31 15 16 
11  15  
12  15  
13 32 17 18, 19 
14  17  
15  17  
16 33 20s  




18  64  
58  64  
19  64  
20  24  
21 35 24 25 
22  24  
23 36 26  
24 37 27  
25 38 28  
28  30  
26 39 30 29 —> 37 
27  30  
29  30  
30  30  
31  30  
32  30  
33  30  
35 41 40  
36 42 41  
41 50 45  
42  45  
43  45  
45  52  
46 61 51  
47 62 52 50, 52 
95  52  
55  55  
56 63 55  
49 71 60 61, 62, 63 
50  60  
51  60  
52  60  
79  60  
53 72 64 22, 23 
61  64  
64 81 65 67 
65 82 66  
66  66  




77  95  
62  70  
72  70  
69  70  
70  70  
71  70  
73  70  
74  70  
78  70  
80  70  
81  70  
82  70  
84 91 75  
85  91  
75  91  
86  91  
87  91  
88  91  
37 92 90  
38  90  
39  90  
94 93 91 80, 85 
59 94 92  
60  92  
90  92  
91  92  
92  92  
93  92  
63  95  
96  95  
97 95 95 71, 93, 96, 97 
98  95  






2. Average of Industry Tariffs in Egypt 1997 – 2018 
  MFN Ad-Valorem Tariffs for Egypt 
Year Mean SD N 
1997 36.204976 14.423953 29 
1998 21.826172 9.1030046 29 
2004 18.268997 28.6012 29 
2005 18.268997 28.6012 29 
2006 18.268997 28.6012 29 
2010 13.108455 15.436586 29 
2011 13.108455 15.436586 29 
2012 13.108935 15.430022 29 
2016 14.340988 15.641597 29 
2017 15.980888 17.013696 29 
2018 15.935832 16.7961 29 
 
3. Average of Industry Tariffs in Kenya 1998 – 2019 
  MFN Ad-Valorem Tariffs for Kenya 
Year Mean SD N 
1998 18.300279 10.338931 27 
1999 18.954788 10.401243 27 
2004 20.680899 8.4596208 23 
2005 16.588913 6.7009718 23 
2018 13.522727 8.4283249 26 





4. Egypt: Year-to-year analysis of industry tariffs 


















5. Kenya: Year-to-year analysis of industry tariffs 
Tariffs in 1999 and 2005 in Kenya 
 
 






6. Industry Share of Informality vs Employment-weighted Tariff 
a. Egypt - Industries 




























Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods  
 
 






Transport, storage and communications  
 
Financial intermediation  
 
 






Other community, social and personal service activities  
 
 







b. Kenya - Industries  




























Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods  
 
 






Transport, storage and communications  
 
 







Real estate, renting and business activities  
 
Other community, social and personal service activities  
 





7. Correlation tables for the estimated informality differentials: 
EGYPT - Correlation of coefficients on industry affiliation 
 1998 2006 2012 2018 
1998 1    
2006 0.8132 1   
2012 0.8283 0.851 1  
2018 0.5851 0.6666 0.5976 1 
     
 2012 - 2006 1998 - 2018   
max, min 0.851 0.5851   
     
average 0.83418    
 
KENYA - Correlation of coefficients on industry affiliation 
 1999 2005 2019 
1999 1   
2005 0.8248 1  
2019 0.6014 0.6714 1 
    
 1999 - 2005 1999-2019  
max, min 0.8248 0.6014  
    






Appendix 3. Haisken-Denew And Schmidt (1997) Two-Step Restricted Least Squares Procedure 
In Appendix 3, we provide an overview of the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step restricted 
least squares procedure used in the second-stage regression for both the main portion and the extension of 
the empirical model. 
Although the exact package-to-package/software-to-software steps originate from our own work, the 
majority of the explanatory content within this section is taken from Zaki and Selwaness (2013).  
The theory 
The Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt procedure is described in three major steps, which are done for each 
year/ time period being considered: 
(1) Creation of the weighting matrix to normalize the estimated coefficients from the first-stage 
regression: 








1 − 𝐼1 −𝐼2 −𝐼3 ⋯ −𝐼𝑗
−𝐼1 1 − 𝐼2 −𝐼3 … −𝐼𝑗
−𝐼1 −𝐼2 … … −𝐼𝑗
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ …







The employment share of the omitted reference industry dummy (52: Retail Trade, for this thesis) is 𝐼𝑗, 
located in the final column of the matrix. 
(2) Normalization of the coefficients to become industry informality differentials: 

















𝐼𝑃𝑘 is the coefficient on the dummy for industry 𝑘. The final row value, 𝐼𝑃𝑗 = 0, in the matrix above 
is where the coefficient on the reference industry dummy would have been, if it had been included.  
With the matrix 𝑊, one could calculate the normalized coefficients 𝐼𝑃𝑗












1 − 𝐼1 −𝐼2 −𝐼3 ⋯ −𝐼𝑗
−𝐼1 1 − 𝐼2 −𝐼3 … −𝐼𝑗
−𝐼1 −𝐼2 … … −𝐼𝑗
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ …







Thanks to the input of Professor Mark Stater (of Trinity College), it has been found that this process is 
simplified in the following equation (which can be simply computed with Excel). 
The normalized industry informality differential for each industry 𝑘 is: 
𝐼𝑃𝑘




(3) Transformation of the covariance-variance matrix to output the transformed variance of the industry 
informality differentials: 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) state that using the inverse of the transformed variance of the informality 
coefficients as weights in the final-stage regression puts more weight on industries with smaller variance 
in informality differentials.  
In order to follow their steps, one must first (1) extract the covariance-variance matrix from the first-





Again, 0 is supposed to denote the covariance-variance on the omitted industry dummy. 
(2) Create the transformed covariance-variance matrix 𝑉𝐶(𝐼𝑃𝑗): 
𝑉𝐶(𝐼𝑃𝑗) = 𝑊 ∗ 𝑉𝐶 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒(𝑊) (2) 
In order to extract the actual transformed variance values, one must extract the diagonal values of 
𝑉𝐶(𝐼𝑃𝑗). 
Practical Approach 





We choose to conduct the normalization process through the three difference packages/ software 
because we believe MATLAB provides much friendlier environment to Matrix multiplication and 





per yeatr into Excel 
file 1
•Run 1st stage 
regression and 
output results and 
cov-var matrix, per 




•Build matrix W by 
extracting the values 
from Excel file 1
•Similarly, build 
matrix alpha and 
VC
•Proceed to 
normalization as in 
equation (1) and (2)
•Extract diagonal 
values of VC(IPj*)
•Output results into 
Excel files
MS Excel & STATA
•Rearrange results 
accordingly in 
outputed MS Excel 
files, to match 
original industry 
classification
•Import into STATA 
with normalized 
coefficients, and 








Appendix 4. Note on Empirical Model Second-Stage 
In using a different model to complete the regressions in the main empirical model, we obtain 
different results: 
The main model we use in the body of this thesis is a fixed effects weighted OLS. However, there 
are two main types of weight that could be used for such purpose: analytical weights (aweights) and 
probability weights (pweights). The results on the variable coefficients for both are the same, even if the 
standard errors and p-value are slightly different ((1) and (2) below). We therefore choose to use pweights. 
Two sample regressions on the second-stage regression of the main model on Egypt are provided 
below 
(1) reg norm_coef_main_star tariffstar [pweight = 1/trans_var_main] 
 
    N 103 
    F(1, 101) 2.39 
    Prob > F 0.125 
    R-squared 0.0227 
Linear regression   Root MSE 0.25196 
inf.coef Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
tariff 0.0068253 0.0044116 1.55 0.125 (-.001926; .0155767) 
_cons 0.0208464 0.0345218 0.6 0.547 (-.0476356; .0893285) 
 
(2) reg norm_coef_main_star tariffstar [aweight = 1/trans_var_main] 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs   =       103 
    F(1, 101)       =      2.34 
Model 0.1487823 1 0.1487823 Prob > F        =    0.1289 
Residual 6.4116856 101 0.06348204 R-squared       =    0.0227 
    Adj R-squared   =    0.0130 
Total 6.5604679 102 0.06431831 Root MSE        =    .25196 
 
inf.coef Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
tariff 0.0068253 0.0044583 1.53 0.129    -.0020188    .0156694 





We also test another (not fixed effects) weighted OLS model controlling for year and industry 
variables. The results using this model are not statistically significant for Egypt, they are much more 
statistically significant for Kenya. We, however, choose to adopt the fixed effects model, manually 
implemented using within estimation, as it represents the theory specifications behind our model. This fixed 
effects model will consider deviations from long-run mean values of depvar and indepvar, which in our 
opinion delivers a better interpretation of the effect of tariff reforms on informality i.e., how much has a 
country’s deviations from its usual trade policy impacted the country’s share of informality. 
We provide below four sample regressions. (3) and (4) are the regressions using OLS controlling 
for time and industry variable, as used in other papers employing Goldberg & Pavcnik (2003), for Egypt 
and Kenya, respectively. We use the 1-year-lagged tariff as indepvar here to highlight the difference in 






reg norm_coef_main tariff_lag_1 i.isic3num i.year [pweight = 1/trans_var_main] 
 
    Number of obs 103 
    F(30, 70) . 
    Prob > F . 
    R-squared 0.9393 
    Root MSE 0.25442 
norm_coef~in Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
tariff_lag_1 0.005509 0.0039425 1.4 0.167 -0.0023546 0.0133716 
       
isic3num       
5 0.145799 0.3342881 0.44 0.664 -0.5209177 0.8125156 
11 -2.544122 0.6792455 -3.75 0 -3.898834 -1.18941 
13 -1.90362 0.1052878 -18.08 0 -2.11361 -1.69363 
14 -1.141237 0.2642237 -4.32 0 -1.668214 -0.6142593 
15 -1.219806 0.0997723 -12.23 0 -1.418796 -1.020817 
17 -1.395157 0.1249697 -11.16 0 -1.644401 -1.145912 
20 -0.025755 0.1755767 -0.15 0.884 -0.3759317 0.3244215 
21 -1.586518 0.51652 -3.07 0.003 -2.616685 -0.5563512 
24 -1.601936 0.1419773 -11.28 0 -1.885101 -1.318771 
26 -1.230807 0.2029479 -6.06 0 -1.635574 -0.8260406 
27 -2.189086 0.171669 -12.75 0 -2.531469 -1.846703 
28 -0.870633 0.1713102 -5.08 0 -1.212301 -0.5289658 
30 -1.062983 0.0885767 -12 0 -1.239644 -0.8863225 
40 -2.59028 0.1063657 -24.35 0 -2.80242 -2.37814 
41 -2.64968 0.2544781 -10.41 0 -3.157221 -2.14214 
45 -0.436156 0.14212 -3.07 0.003 -0.7196052 -0.1527065 
51 -1.054938 0.1779012 -5.93 0 -1.40975 -0.7001249 
55 -0.699432 0.0961128 -7.28 0 -0.8911234 -0.5077414 
60 -0.759822 0.2011297 -3.78 0 -1.160962 -0.3586812 
64 -1.991561 0.1582998 -12.58 0 -2.30728 -1.675842 
65 -2.31576 0.1660807 -13.94 0 -2.646998 -1.984523 
66 -2.238831 0.1674439 -13.37 0 -2.572787 -1.904875 
70 -0.807919 0.1695882 -4.76 0 -1.146152 -0.4696858 
75 -2.434761 0.1252793 -19.43 0 -2.684623 -2.184899 
90 -1.8032 0.2779177 -6.49 0 -2.357489 -1.248911 
91 -2.129554 0.1479878 -14.39 0 -2.424706 -1.834401 




95 -0.344943 0.207007 -1.67 0.1 -0.7578055 0.0679193 
       
year       
2006 0.107638 0.1218535 0.88 0.38 -0.1353915 0.3506668 
2012 -0.05695 0.1371722 -0.42 0.679 -0.3305316 0.2166308 
2018 -0.099252 0.1563789 -0.63 0.528 -0.4111394 0.2126363 
       







reg norm_coef_main tariff_lag_1 i.isic3num i.year [pweight = 1/trans_var_main] 
      
    Number of obs 76 
    F(30, 70) . 
    Prob > F . 
    R-squared 0.9324 
    Root MSE 0.29645 
norm_coef~in Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t     
       
tariff_lag_1 -0.0199165 0.0072304 -2.75 0.009 -0.0344979 -0.0053351 
       
isic3num       
2 -0.6323869 0.2728431 -2.32 0.025 -1.182627 -0.0821463 
5 0.2145514 0.1376816 1.56 0.126 -0.06311 0.4922128 
11 -1.394247 0.1123656 -12.41 0 -1.620853 -1.16764 
13 -1.353596 0.138069 -9.8 0 -1.632038 -1.075153 
14 0.1965959 0.0839865 2.34 0.024 0.027221 0.3659709 
15 -0.5567858 0.5103891 -1.09 0.281 -1.586083 0.4725119 
17 -0.1993584 0.1596682 -1.25 0.219 -0.5213602 0.1226433 
20 0.0387247 0.3877552 0.1 0.921 -0.7432582 0.8207076 
21 -0.1628524 0.2039253 -0.8 0.429 -0.5741069 0.2484021 
24 -0.5749776 0.2666157 -2.16 0.037 -1.112659 -0.0372959 
26 -0.7961445 0.138069 -5.77 0 -1.074587 -0.5177019 
27 -0.6736298 0.3077633 -2.19 0.034 -1.294294 -0.052966 
28 -0.3758311 0.1941267 -1.94 0.059 -0.7673248 0.0156627 
30 -0.3948946 0.0578566 -6.83 0 -0.5115735 -0.2782157 
40 -1.682994 0.2869865 -5.86 0 -2.261758 -1.104231 
41 -1.565824 0.6053305 -2.59 0.013 -2.786589 -0.3450587 
45 -0.2781455 0.0871972 -3.19 0.003 -0.4539955 -0.1022956 
51 -0.2067587 0.1951833 -1.06 0.295 -0.6003834 0.186866 
55 -0.5670185 0.2622957 -2.16 0.036 -1.095988 -0.0380488 
60 -0.3907033 0.134508 -2.9 0.006 -0.6619646 -0.119442 
64 -1.127987 0.2114183 -5.34 0 -1.554353 -0.7016213 
65 -1.114673 0.1668139 -6.68 0 -1.451086 -0.7782608 
66 -1.134021 0.2338775 -4.85 0 -1.60568 -0.6623621 
70 -1.181743 0.1184061 -9.98 0 -1.420532 -0.9429544 
75 -2.602592 0.2217188 -11.74 0 -3.049731 -2.155454 
90 -1.725034 0.1728232 -9.98 0 -2.073565 -1.376503 




92 -1.046597 0.1239967 -8.44 0 -1.29666 -0.7965337 
95 -0.5400715 0.2242211 -2.41 0.02 -0.9922563 -0.0878866 
       
year       
2005 0.1679006 0.1129906 1.49 0.145 -0.0599667 0.3957679 
2019 0.4005829 0.1432522 2.8 0.008 0.1116873 0.6894786 
       
_cons 0.2944387 0.0944375 3.12 0.003 0.1039874 0.48489 
 
As one can observe, the coefficients are of the same sign as the fixed effects model (despite 
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